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ABSTRACT  
The aim of this paper is to analyse the effects of the implementation of the Internal 
Market Programme and to propose ideas on how its potential can be better exploited. 
First, the paper offers a broader perspective to the analysis of the Internal Market by 
exploring its close links to the rapidly changing economic environment. Second, it puts 
together a comprehensive body of empirical evidence, based on the analysis of trade, 
FDI, M&A, prices and regulation data, which allows for a thorough stock taking 
exercise of what has been achieved in terms of European economic integration. Thirdly, 
it analyses the remaining barriers to the completion of the Internal Market while 
presenting a critical review of the adequacy of the instruments that have been used so 
far.  
Overall the paper concludes that the Internal Market is a powerful instrument to 
promote economic integration and to increase competition within the EU and that it has 
been the source of large macro-economic benefits. However, these gains could have been 
substantially larger if the removal of most of the remaining cross-border barriers was 
achieved. In particular, the initial expectations that the Internal Market would serve as a 
catalyst for creating a more dynamic, innovative and competitive economy at the world 
level have not been met. Various reasons for this are identified, namely: the slow and 
sometimes incomplete implementation of directives, the inadequacy of some instruments, 
the persistence of barriers to cross-border trade and investment particularly in services 
and the slow development of an Internal Market for knowledge. Building on the evidence 
and analysis provided, the paper concludes with eight suggestions to guide the design of 
policymaking for the Internal Market in the 21
st century. 
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 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
1. BACKGROUND AND OBJECTIVES 
 
Internal Market 
aims at 
integration, 
competition and 
innovation, but … 
The European Internal Market project, which was initiated in the 
mid-1980s with the publication of the White Paper on the Single 
Market Programme, signalled the end of a period of euro-pessimism 
associated with the political, economic and monetary crises of the 
1970s and the early 1980s. It opened up perspectives for restoring 
confidence of European business and for improving the performance 
of European companies through the formation of a better integrated, 
more competitive and innovative market place. The removal of non-
tariff barriers was targeted at creating a large integrated market for 
goods and services, allowing the realisation of economies of scale. 
The fiercer competition in this integrated market was expected to 
result in (allocative and productive) efficiency gains. It was also 
aimed at providing increased incentives for European producers to 
invest in product and process innovations, thereby improving the 
dynamic efficiency of the European economy. For European 
consumers, the Internal Market was also seen as a source of benefits 
through wider choice and lower prices. 
… its potential 
has not been fully 
exploited. 
While the Internal Market has contributed to promote integration 
and, to a certain extent, competition within the EU, its potential has 
not been fully exploited. Initial expectations that the Internal Market 
would be a launching pad for a more dynamic, innovative and 
competitive economy at world level have not been met. In the early 
1980s, the convergence in the EU level of GDP per capita towards 
that of the US came to an end. Over the past ten years, the average 
annual per capita growth rate of the European Union has been even 
below that of the US. The Single Market Review provides an 
opportunity to redefine the strategy for the Internal Market and to 
give it new impetus. 
Paper addresses 
three main issues 
and suggests eight 
areas that could 
be further 
developed into a 
new Internal 
Market strategy. 
 
The aim of this paper is to shed light on the economic principles 
underlying the Internal Market and to offer ideas on how its 
potential can be better exploited. This paper should be seen as a 
contribution to the on-going Single Market Review. From this 
perspective, the paper addresses three main issues. Section 2 
explores to what extent the environment in which the Internal 
Market operates today is different from that of the late 1980s-early 
1990s. Section 3 presents the latest empirical evidence on the 
economic impact of the Internal Market. Section 4 investigates why 
the Internal Market has failed to live up to early expectations. On 
the basis of these investigations, section 5 suggests eight ideas that 
could be further developed within the context of the Single Market 
Review. 
62. THE CHANGING ENVIRONMENT OF THE INTERNAL MARKET 
 
The environment 
of the Internal 
Market has been 
changed by the 
growing 
importance of 
services and the 
fast development 
of technologies, 
… 
The environment in which the Internal Market operates in the 21st 
century is very different from the context of the Internal Market at 
the beginning of the 1990s. First, this environment has been 
modified by the growing importance of services and the fast 
development of information and communication technologies 
(ICT). Services account for 70% of employment and value added 
but only for 20% of intra-EU trade, indicating their low tradability 
within the EU. Labour productivity growth in services is generally 
lower than in the US, except in sectors such as telecommunications 
which have been opened up to competition. With the increased 
tradability of services, competition at world level has increased and 
improvements in the competitive performance of the European 
services sectors have become more urgent. Moreover, as some of 
these sectors, such as telecommunications, transport, energy and 
financial services, provide inputs to a large number of other 
economic activities their performance has implications for the 
competitiveness of the European economy as a whole.  
   
… by EMU,…  Second, the creation of the EMU has reinforced the integration and 
the competition effects of the Internal Market by reducing the costs 
of cross-border activities (elimination of the costs of managing 
multiple currencies and of exchange rate risks) and by increasing 
the transparency of prices. However, the relations between EMU 
and the Single Market go in both directions. A well functioning and 
flexible Internal Market which allows for a rapid market based 
adjustment in the case of shocks is essential for a smooth 
functioning of EMU. More competitive product markets are 
essential in ensuring price and wage flexibility in EMU. Labour 
mobility can also contribute to facilitate adjustment in EMU but it 
has remained rather low in the EU.   
 
… by EU 
enlargement … 
Third, since the early 1990s, several rounds of enlargement have 
taken place leading to the expansion of the Internal Market. In 
particular, the recent accession of ten new Member States 
substantially increased the size of the Internal Market, while 
constituting at the same time a challenge to its proper functioning. 
On the one hand, the accession of the central and eastern European 
countries has increased the pool of consumers and has provided 
firms with additional opportunities to draw on a wider range of 
comparative advantages characterising the different Member States. 
This is a source of further dynamism and efficiency in the Internal 
Market. On the other hand, while the economic changes induced by 
this enlargement have been absorbed quite smoothly and there is no 
evidence of disruptive impacts on the product and labour markets, 
the increased divergence among the EU25 members has augmented 
the risks of tensions within the Internal Market, such as in the areas 
7of the opening up of services markets, tax competition and 
migration flows. 
… by ageing …  The EU will undergo unprecedented demographic change in coming 
decades. The population of working-age in Europe will start to 
shrink from 2010 and is projected to decline by 17% between 2010 
and 2050. While net inflows to immigrants can partially offset 
demographic developments, immigration could not on its own solve 
the problems linked to ageing. However, immigration may have 
positive effects on the functioning of the labour market by relieving 
the labour shortages in certain areas. 
 
… and by the 
forces of 
globalisation. 
Finally, rising international economic integration has increased the 
competitive pressures faced by European companies. On the one 
hand, the EU is confronted by the dominance of the US in sectors 
with high knowledge content. On the other hand, strong competitors 
also emerge in Asia. China, industrialising with a large and growing 
stock of foreign direct investment together with its own scientific 
base, has begun to compete not only in low but also in high value-
added manufacturing goods. India’s challenge is no less real — 
notably in the service sector where it is a big beneficiary of the 
‘offshoring’ or ‘outsourcing’ of service sector functions with an 
enormous pool of educated, cheap, English speaking workers. The 
potential rapid growth of the Chinese and Indian economies creates 
not only new competitors to Europe, but also offer new 
opportunities with their vast and growing markets. A large and 
competitive Internal Market is a necessary prerequisite for Europe 
to fully seize these opportunities because it contributes to create a 
business environment providing incentives for firms to improve 
efficiency and invest in innovation.  
 
3. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ON THE EFFECTS OF THE INTERNAL MARKET 
 
The Internal 
Market has 
resulted in a 2.2% 
increase of the 
EU GDP in 2006 
and the creation 
of 2.75 million 
additional jobs. 
The enlarged Internal Market (including liberalisation of network 
industries) is an important source of growth and jobs. As a result of 
the progress made over the period 1992-2006 in achieving an 
enlarged Internal Market of 25 Member States, GDP and 
employment levels have increased significantly. The estimated 
'gains' from the Internal Market amount to 2.2% of EU value added 
and 1.4% of total employment (or 2.75 million jobs). Moreover, 
these gains could be doubled with the removal of most of the 
remaining Internal Market barriers. 
   
Integration  The Internal Market, but also EMU and enlargement, have 
contributed to reinforce the integration of European product 
8Increasing trend 
but slowdown 
since 2000… 
markets. However, the pace of European market integration appears 
to have slowed down over the recent period. The intra-EU trade to 
GDP ratio increased strongly during the second half of the 1990s 
but stabilised in 2000. Similarly, there is evidence showing that in 
the years following the implementation of the 1992 Single Market 
Programme, FDI activity in the EU increased. The convergence of 
price levels between the 25 Member States has also progressed 
substantially but within the EU15 price dispersion has remained 
more or less stable in recent years. The introduction of the euro 
appears to have boosted trade, FDI activity and cross-border 
mergers within the euro area. The level of price dispersion in the 
euro area is half that observed in the EU25. While, the increased 
transparency of prices associated with EMU has had little effect on 
the pace of price convergence amongst euro area members, price 
dispersion across the EMU was in 2001 already similar to that 
observed among the main US cities. 
… and the 
potential  not 
completely 
exhausted. 
It is quite natural to observe a slowing down over time in the 
process of European product market integration as remaining 
barriers are increasingly difficult to remove. Nevertheless, the 
potential for further progress does not appear to be completely 
exhausted: the US still is a more integrated trade area than the EU. 
This argument is staved by the observation that the ratio of intra-US 
States exports to GDP is around 70% higher than the ratio of intra-
EU15 exports to GDP.  
 
Competition 
Reduction in 
profit margins 
offset by 
efficiency gains 
… 
The Internal Market and EMU have changed the conditions of 
competition in the EU by facilitating market entry by new firms and 
by reducing the ability of European firms to segment national 
markets geographically. Empirical evidence shows that on average, 
price-cost margins of the sectors most affected by the Single Market 
Programme declined. European companies reacted to this decline in 
profit margins by reducing their costs, which indicates that the SMP 
was a source of efficiency gains. These efficiency gains have been 
obtained through an increased presence on the markets of other 
Member States (increased multinationality) and a concentration of 
activities on the core businesses of companies (reduced sectoral 
diversification). 
   
… considerable 
turbulence in 
market 
leadership… 
The sharper competition in the Internal Market contributed to the 
elimination or take-over of the least efficient firms. As a result, 
production concentration at the level of the EU as a whole increased 
somewhat on average. However, this average hides a rich diversity 
across industries with highly concentrated sectors in particular 
having witnessed a decline in concentration. At the same time, there 
was considerable turbulence in market leadership in EU 
manufacturing industries, which would seem to suggest that the 
level of competition on EU product markets has increased. 
   
… but a lack of  Despite the improvement in the competitive environment, rules and 
9business 
dynamism… 
regulations in Europe appear to act as a constraint on the mobility 
of economic resources to more productive activities. Regulatory 
requirements have their origin in local, national and EU level 
legislation. However, costs generated by EU legislation (including 
Internal market rules and regulations) will often be lower than those 
flowing from different pieces of national legislation. Nevertheless, 
unnecessary regulation is a serious issue that risks holding back 
business with negative consequences for EU competitiveness. In the 
retail sector, for example, restrictions emanating from spatial 
planning regulations work as an impediment to the introduction of 
new production technologies (including ICT) and hinder the 
reallocation of labour to more productive shopping outlets. 
Business dynamism, as measured by entry and exit, is essential for 
growth to the extent that less efficient firms are eliminated from the 
market and that new entrants innovate more. Progress has been 
made in facilitating business start-ups. Nevertheless, in most EU 
countries it is still more difficult to start a new business than in the 
US. Not only entry per se but also the growth performance of 
enterprises in the years after entry is important. In this respect, the 
US seem to be better able to reallocate resources towards more 
productive firms, as post entry growth performance among 
surviving firms is markedly higher in the US than in Europe. This is 
an indication of remaining barriers to firm growth, such as 
imperfect financial markets leading to lower financing possibilities 
for entrepreneurs with small or innovative projects. 
 
 
…and price 
rigidities persist. 
The results of recent surveys on price-setting behaviour also point 
to lack of flexibility on product markets. They show that consumer 
prices are less flexible in the euro area than in the US. In particular, 
prices of services are less flexible downwards and this might be 
related to the remaining regulatory barriers in these sectors. The 
existence of price rigidities tends to complicate the conduct of 
monetary policy. The above mentioned surveys also indicate that 
euro area firms do not set competitive prices and that around 80% 
of euro area firms continue to price discriminate. Therefore, despite 
the positive effects of integration, there is still room for improving 
the conditions of competition within the Internal Market. The 
openness of the Internal Market can play a key role in this respect. 
   
 
10External 
dimension 
The Internal 
Market appeared 
to have lost its 
attractiveness for 
foreign investors 
and it did not 
provide an 
environment 
conducive to the 
expansion of 
activities in fast 
growing markets 
and sectors... 
 
Over the recent period, the Internal Market seems to have lost its 
attractiveness for foreign investors, especially in comparison with 
fast growing markets. While this geographical shift may be partly 
explained by the evolution of the international division of labour, a 
more worrying evolution is that the EU market has also become less 
attractive in high-tech industries and for R&D international 
investments. A more integrated and efficient Internal Market should 
also help European companies to expand their activities in fast 
growing markets and sectors. However, since 2000, EU firms have 
been less active than the US ones in fast growing Asian markets. 
Finally, while the Internal Market and EMU have been associated 
with trade boosting effects and the EU25 has managed to maintain 
its share of world exports and imports over the last decade, the 
EU25 continues to reveal a comparative disadvantage in high tech 
sectors including ICT. The lag of the EU in developing ICT 
industries can be partly explained by a lack of progress in the 
creation of a competitive Internal Market for services and to a 
European innovation deficit.  
   
Innovation 
 
….and has been 
an insufficient 
driver for 
innovation. 
According to the last Innovation Scoreboard, most EU countries lag 
behind the top performers like the US and Japan in terms of 
innovation. The EU innovation environment remains weak in a 
number of key "input "indicators, such as the amount of public and 
private R&D and the stock of science and technology researchers, as 
well as weaknesses of the higher education system. However, in 
addition to input deficiencies, market conditions and knowledge 
networks are key areas of EU weakness. European companies are 
not sufficiently encouraged to innovate and, in this respect, the 
Internal Market has been an insufficient driver of innovation: some 
markets, in particular in services, remain too fragmented, a clearer 
and more efficient Intellectual Property Rights system is lacking, the 
potential of public procurement has been insufficiently exploited 
and the European Research area is still fragmented, leading to 
duplication and waste of resources. All these elements can also 
contribute to explain why the Internal Market is losing its 
attractiveness for international R&D investments compared to the 
US and China.  
114. WHY HAS THE POTENTIAL OF THE INTERNAL  MARKET NOT BEEN FULLY 
EXPLOITED? 
 
The Internal 
Market is still 
incomplete 
because … 
There are various reasons why the Internal Market has not lived up 
to its full potential. Clearly the Internal Market was an enormous 
challenge right from the start. Freeing up the movement of goods, 
services, capital and persons across Europe cannot be achieved 
from one day to the next. Nevertheless, it is somewhat 
disappointing that fifteen years after the so-called "completion of 
the Single Market" multiple barriers continue to hinder cross-border 
activities within the EU. Moreover, from an economic growth 
perspective it is quite disappointing that the gains from the Internal 
Market have been mostly static in nature, resulting in a one-off 
increase in living standards and that dynamic gains reflected in 
higher economic growth rates have been more difficult to achieve. 
On the other hand, it has to be acknowledged that in a changing 
environment the Internal Market will never be truly complete. The 
Single Market has always been somewhat of a moving target. This 
section offers some more specific explanations for the 
"incompleteness" of the Internal Market. 
   
… 
implementation is 
slow and 
sometimes 
incorrect, … 
First, the speed with which Internal Market Directives are agreed, 
transposed into national legislation and actually implemented has 
been rather slow. In light of the need to consider the interests of all 
parties involved it may be difficult to speed up the decision making 
process. This is why the focus has been on improving transposition 
and implementation. Targets agreed within the context of the 
Lisbon Strategy for Growth and Jobs and peer pressure exerted 
through the reporting on Member States' performance in the 
Internal Market Scoreboard have had a positive effect. 
Nevertheless, in June 2006 the transposition deficit of the 25 
Member States equalled 1.9% on average, which is still above the 
agreed target of 1.5%. In the view of the prominent role of the 
Internal Market as an adjustment mechanism in EMU, the poor 
performance of many euro area Member States in this respect is a 
special source of concern.   Nine percent of outstanding Directives 
have not been transposed into national legislation in at least one 
Member State. Moreover, Internal Market rules are not always 
correctly applied as illustrated by the high number of infringement 
cases the Commission has had to launch. 
 
… policy 
instruments are 
not fully 
operational … 
Second, other instruments that ensure the smooth functioning of the 
Internal Market are not fully operational. The application of the 
principle of mutual recognition leaves much to be desired. It is 
hampered by legal uncertainty and a lack of awareness of 
companies' rights both from the side of the companies themselves 
and that of the national authorities. The adoption of agreed 
standards is an alternative tool to remove trade barriers. It offers the 
12further benefit of ensuring a minimum degree of compatibility and 
interoperability of traded products. However, agreeing on such 
standards is a very time consuming process, which can be 
problematic in times of rapid technological change. The "New 
Approach" to standardisation is a more flexible and simplified 
regulatory tool. It leaves manufacturers the freedom to decide on 
technical detail within the context of agreed common principles. 
The Internal Market could profit from a more effective use of the 
"New Approach". It would also benefit from a more rapid opening 
up of public procurement. Currently only 22% of public 
procurement is published and thus open to competition. Some 
activities, notably in the defence sector, are exempted from the 
obligations spelled out in EU public procurement directives. 
 
… barriers persist 
in certain sectors 
… 
Third, the defence sector is not the only one in which barriers to 
cross-border trade and investment refuse to go away. Barriers in 
services are more prevalent than in manufacturing. Cross-border 
transactions in services often require the presence of the service 
provider in both countries, creating uncertainty about which 
country's rules to apply. The Services Directive aims to overcome 
such regulatory obstacles. While EMU and the introduction of the 
euro have provided a major impetus to financial integration in the 
EU, the financial sectors in the Member States continue to reflect 
specific national conditions and preferences. At the EU level, a 
divergence has emerged between the real sector which increasingly 
operates on a cross-border basis and a still fragmented financial 
sector. The on-going process of liberalisation in the network 
industries, while taking account of the need to provide services of 
general economic interest, implies a stepwise opening up of the 
telecommunications, postal services, energy and transport sectors to 
competition. Differences between countries in the pace of 
liberalisation and in the role of regulators in liberalised markets, as 
well as insufficient cross-border interconnection infrastructure have 
contributed to sustain existing barriers between national markets. 
Finally, the existence of 25 different tax systems creates barriers to 
the mobility of factors and thus to the full implementation of the 
Internal Market.  
 
… and an 
Internal Market 
for knowledge is 
still missing. 
Fourth, the Single Market Programme never truly addressed the 
need to create in Internal Market for knowledge. The presumption 
was that knowledge spillovers would be a by-product of increased 
trade and investment. There is evidence however that only a quarter 
of innovative companies launch their new product in countries other 
than their own. Other means of knowledge diffusion, such as patent 
disclosure and licensing, are therefore essential to stimulate 
technological progress and productivity growth across the 
Community territory. The European system for the protection of 
intellectual property rights has struggled with finding the right 
balance between encouraging the creation of knowledge (by 
rewarding innovators) and stimulating its diffusion (through the 
prevention of strategic use of patents aimed at blocking market 
13entry of competitors). Moreover, it would benefit from a 
clarification and simplification of applicable rules; a reduction in 
the costs of obtaining patent protection; and a predictable, cost 
effective and accessible resolution of disputes. 
 
5. REFLECTIONS ON THE INTERNAL MARKET IN THE 21
ST CENTURY 
 
Eight ideas to be 
further developed 
within the context 
of the Single 
Market Review. 
This paper has analysed the underlying factors explaining why the 
potential of the Internal Market has not been fully exploited: (i) 
existing instruments to remove non-tariff barriers to cross-border 
transactions and factor movements are not fully adequate (ii) some 
markets remain fragmented and (iii) the Internal Market has failed 
to fully adapt to a changing environment. Based on this analysis, it 
is possible to sketch a new vision for the Internal Market in the 21
st 
century. This section puts forward eight ideas that could be further 
developed within the context of the Single Market Review. 
   
Internal Markets 
for services and 
knowledge are 
essential for 
productivity 
growth. 
 
Due to the development of information and communication 
technologies in particular, services have become increasingly 
tradable. As a result, services producers in the EU are becoming 
more and more exposed to competition from third countries. An 
integrated and competitive home market is essential to face this 
challenge and raise productivity levels in the services sector. If the 
EU wants to replicate the spurt in productivity growth that the US 
has experienced, it will need to stimulate the use of new 
technologies in services such as wholesale and retail trade, financial 
services and professional business services. A more rapid diffusion 
of cost-effective production technologies supported by better 
developed Internal Market for knowledge is essential in this respect. 
Reforms in the European system of Intellectual Property Rights and 
better exploitation of the public procurement tool can also 
contribute to this objective.  
   
The Internal 
Market can 
contribute to the 
smooth 
functioning of 
EMU. 
The Internal Market is essential for a smooth functioning of EMU 
because it speeds up the process of adjustment to shocks by creating 
a more competitive business environment. More in particular, it 
increases incentives for firms to adapt prices, wages and quantities 
to changing market conditions. A better functioning Internal Market 
also eases the reallocation of resources across the EU territory. 
Therefore, facilitating such adjustment processes in EMU by 
promoting competition should be an essential component of the 
Internal Market in the 21
st century. More flexible wage and price 
setting behaviour, more integrated and developed financial markets, 
a better functioning single market for services, as well as more 
flexible labour markets emerge as having a very important influence 
14in this respect.  
 
Enlargement has 
increased the 
heterogeneity 
within the 
Internal Market. 
Enlargement has increased the opportunities to be reaped from the 
Internal Market but it has also increased the heterogeneity among 
its members, increasing the risks of tensions between Member 
States. Differences in industrial structure and the stage of economic 
development tend to be reflected in different economic priorities.  
This diversity might be resolved naturally as the new Member 
States catch up with the EU average and differences in industrial 
structure gradually disappear. This however might take some time 
and tensions in areas such as corporate taxation and migration 
might have to be addressed in the meantime.  
   
The Internal 
Market rules 
should be 
considered within 
a global context. 
The radical reduction in international communication and 
coordination costs imply that EU firms can offshore specific tasks 
within the production process, leading to a new paradigm of 
globalisation. This task-level off-shoring implies that building-up 
the ability of individual workers to respond to different tasks and 
ensuring sufficient flexibility in the economic system to allow 
workers to move around are crucially important to seize the 
opportunities and minimise the adjustment costs of globalisation. 
Lessons can also be drawn from the policy used by our trading 
partners to enhance their competitiveness. For example, the 
dominance of US in certain fields such as ICT may be linked to 
state support in early development of technologies in these fields. In 
Europe, there is no defence equipment market and Member States 
concentrate too much on supporting weak companies and sectors. 
Finally, when drawing up Internal Market rules, it is important to 
agree at the EU level on standards that neither compromise the 
ability of EU exporters to sell abroad, nor limit the entry of imports 
in the EU market. A wider use internationally of Europe’s high 
standards in terms of consumer and environmental protection 
would be beneficial in this respect.  
 
Well designed 
Internal Market 
and external trade 
policies are 
mutually 
supportive. 
The Internal Market is necessary to improve the competitiveness of 
European companies at world level. However, it is not sufficient to 
ensure that EU firms thrive in the global economy. Well designed 
external policies aimed foremost at ensuring that fair-trade rules are 
observed are complementary to internal policies. Only if EU firms 
are granted non-discriminatory access to markets across the world 
can the benefits from the Internal Market be fully reaped. This 
illustrates the benefits of ensuring consistency between internal and 
external policies. 
 
 
 
Potential 
synergies between 
The Internal Market policies may be integrated into a systemic 
approach combining various policy instruments and creating the 
15the Internal 
Market policies 
and competition 
and innovation 
policies can be 
better exploited. 
appropriate framework conditions for European firms to be 
competitive at world level. For example, the Internal Market 
integration policies could be linked to competition (state aids, 
merger control and anti-trust) and innovation (R&D, education, 
ICT) policies, the other two economic mechanisms through which 
efficiency on product markets can be improved. For example, 
efficiency and innovation considerations could be better taken into 
account when designing competition policy. Steps in this direction 
have been taken in the new Merger Regulation and in the new 
framework for State Aid for R&D and Innovation. Similarly, a more 
efficient regulation of electronic communications and a better 
system of IPRs could contribute to the development of new 
technologies in Europe. There are strong spillovers between 
national and Community policies, as well. All Member States 
contribute to the well-functioning of the Internal Market, which can 
be considered as a common good. In areas where achieving a 
critical mass justify Community actions, an increased exploitation 
of synergies between Community and national policies can help to 
ensure that available resources are used more efficiently.  
   
Adjustment costs 
associated with 
market 
integration need 
to be considered. 
This would 
involve a close 
monitoring of the 
impact of reforms 
undertaken. 
Deepening the Internal Market implies the opening up to 
competition of sectors (such as the services sector) that are 
politically sensitive, because it directly affects the employment of a 
large number of people. Unless an effort is made to increase the 
public acceptability of market opening and liberalisation it will be 
very difficult to enact these reforms. In order to increase 
acceptability, it is crucial to provide evidence illustrating the overall 
benefits of reforms proposed; to consider the most appropriate 
sequencing of reforms; and to facilitate the process of adjustment 
particularly for those most directly affected. From this, it should be 
clear that reform proposals should be carefully prepared, 
necessitating theoretical analysis and diagnosis to guide the policy 
design ex ante. Moreover, once the reforms have been implemented 
it will be important to ensure a close monitoring of the effects of the 
reforms undertaken. 
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A move from a 
legalistic 
approach to a 
more economic 
approach based 
on the monitoring 
of markets offers 
potential benefits. 
Better Internal Market regulation depends on a better understanding 
of the obstacles preventing markets from functioning well. This 
would imply moving from a largely legalistic approach to a more 
economic approach, based on the monitoring of markets. This more 
economic approach has started to be implemented in the area of 
competition policy, where sector enquiries, such as those 
undertaken in the energy and retail banking sectors, have proven to 
be a valuable tool for identifying the nature and scope of 
competition problems within the Internal Market. However, the 
market monitoring to be developed should be wider in scope and 
analyse also barriers to market integration and market access, 
technological developments and innovation and price and wage 
adjustments to changing market conditions. Internal Market 
monitoring would benefit from increased transparency and priority 
setting.  
 
17 STEPS TOWARDS A DEEPER ECONOMIC INTEGRATION:  
THE INTERNAL MARKET IN THE 21
ST CENTURY 
 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
The European Union and its Member States have been engaged in a process of market 
integration over a long period. A key objective of economic integration has been the 
removal or elimination of barriers between Member States' markets. A cornerstone of 
this process was the adoption and implementation of a major legislative programme, the 
Single Market Program, resulting in the elimination of non-tariff trade barriers by 1
st 
January 1993. The removal of these barriers was targeted at creating a large integrated 
market for goods and services, allowing the realisation of economies of scale. The fiercer 
competition in this integrated market was expected to result in (allocative and 
productive) efficiency gains. It was also aimed at providing increased incentives for 
European producers to invest in product and process innovations, thereby improving the 
dynamic efficiency of the European economy. For European consumers, the Internal 
Market was also seen as a source of benefits through wider choice and lower prices. 
While the Internal Market has contributed to promote integration and, to a certain extent, 
competition within the EU, its potential has not been fully exploited. Initial expectations 
that the Internal Market would be a launching pad for a more dynamic, innovative and 
competitive economy at world level have not been met. In the early 1980s, the 
convergence in the EU level of GDP per capita towards that of the US came to an end. 
Over the past ten years, the average annual per capita growth rate of the European Union 
has been even below that of the US. The on-going Single Market Review provides an 
opportunity to redefine the strategy for the Internal Market and to give it new impetus. 
This paper offers an economic perspective on the different issues currently under 
discussion within the context of the Review.  
This paper addresses the three following questions. First, to what extent is the 
environment in which the Internal Market operates today different from that of the late 
1980s-early 1990s? Second, what is the latest empirical evidence on the economic impact 
of the Internal Market? Third, why has the Internal Market failed to live up to early 
expectations? The answers to these three questions should help to shed light on the 
economic principles underlying the Internal Market and offer ideas on how its potential 
can be further exploited. 
2.  THE CHANGING ENVIRONMENT OF THE INTERNAL MARKET 
This chapter explains the context in which the Internal Market operates since the 
completion of the Single Market Programme in 1992. It analyses the impact of 
subsequent policy initiatives that have led to further market integration, notably the use 
of a common currency in a large area within the Internal Market and the widening of the 
Internal Market through EU enlargement. It also considers the increased economic 
importance of the services sectors from an Internal Market perspective. The final section 
of this chapter discusses the role of the Internal Market in ensuring EU competitiveness 
in an increasingly global economy. 
182.1.  Single Market Programme 
The publication of the White Paper on the Single Market Programme (SMP) in 1985 
signalled the end of a period of euro-pessimism associated with the political, economic 
and monetary crises of the 1970s and early 1980s. The 1988 Cecchini Report delved into 
the structural weaknesses underlying the poor performance of the European economy
1. It 
highlighted the fact that European industry had a relatively weak specialisation in sectors 
with high growth potential, which was associated with especially low productivity levels 
in those sectors and resulted in substantial losses in world market export shares (see 
Figure 2-1), problems that must not sound unfamiliar to current policy makers. At the 
time, the SMP initiative opened up perspectives for restoring confidence, increasing 
competition and improving the competitiveness of European enterprises. 
Figure 2-1:  Weak EU performance in sectors with high growth potential, 1985 
Source: European Commission - Cecchini Report (1988)
If not indicated data refer to the year 1985
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The SMP presented a comprehensive list of measures intended to eliminate physical, 
technical and fiscal non-tariff barriers to the movement of goods, services, capital and 
persons inside the Community. To this end, it planned to remove border controls, 
standardise industrial regulations, open up government procurement, liberalise financial 
markets and establish the right to free establishment in other services, harmonize VAT 
rates, and generally remove barriers to competition among EC firms. The deadline for 
achieving the Single Market was set for end 1992.  
Since that time, the definitions of the Internal Market and the expectations towards it 
have been constantly changing, taking into account the newly arising opportunities and 
challenges of the global environment. While initially the measures foreseen in the SMP 
mainly concerned manufacturing industries, over time there has been a gradual widening 
of the SMP's scope. In following years precedents were set that liberalised cross-border 
delivery of services and freedom of establishment, culminating in the much discussed 
services directive. This development reflected the increased economic importance and 
tradability of services. The success of the liberalisation process in the network industries 
                                                 
1 See: Cecchini (1988). 
19largely depended on market entry, including by competitors from abroad. These broader 
needs for market integration were reflected in the Internal Market Strategy, which set out 
the main policy objectives in the years following the completion of the SMP in 1992
2. 
Box 2.1:  STRATEGIES FOR THE INTERNAL  MARKET AFTER THE PUBLICATION OF THE 1985  WHITE 
PAPER   
Action Plan of June 1997 
This Action Plan aimed at removing the remaining obstacles in order to improve the performance of the 
Internal Market. It included four strategic targets:  
−  Tighter enforcement of exiting Internal Market rules (e.g., in the area of public procurement) ; 
−  Dealing with key market distortions (e. g ., rigorous application of State aid control) ; 
−  Elimination of sectoral obstacles to market integration, especially in services ; 
−  Delivering an Internal Market for all citizens. 
An Internal Market Scoreboard is published to record the progress made in these areas. 
 
New strategy for the Internal Market of 1999 
In 1999, the Commission has presented a new framework defining 4 strategic objectives for the Internal 
Market: 
−  To improve the quality of life of citizens ; 
−  To enhance efficiency of Community product and capital markets ; 
−  To improve business environment ; 
−  To exploit the achievements of the Internal Market in a changing world. 
The actions necessary to achieve these strategic objectives were defined and adapted every year to take 
into account the reactions of markets, business and citizens. 
 
Strategy for the Internal Market: priorities 2003-2006 
In 2003, the Commission presented a ten point action plan defining the priorities to improve the operation 
of the Internal Market over the period 2003-2006. This new strategy has been put in place to take into 
account the Lisbon objective, the challenges of enlargement and ageing. 
 The ten priorities were: 
−  Facilitate the free movement of goods (e.g., by improving the implementation of the mutual 
recognition principle); 
−  Integrating services markets ; 
−  Ensuring high quality network industries 
−  Reducing the impact of tax obstacles ; 
−  Expanding procurement opportunities ; 
−  Improving conditions for business (e. g., by adopting a Community patent) ; 
−  Meeting the demographic challenge (e. g., by improving the portability of pension rights) ; 
−  Simplifying the regulatory environment ; 
−  Enforcing the rules; 
−  Providing more and better information. 
2.2.  Economic and Monetary Union 
The next major step in European economic integration was the creation of an Economic 
and Monetary Union (EMU) in 1999 and the introduction of euro coins and bills in 2002. 
The remainder of this section explains that not only the EMU complements the Internal 
Market but also the Internal Market is essential for a smooth functioning of EMU. 
                                                 
2 See: Ilzkovitz (2006). 
202.2.1. How the EMU complements and enforces the mechanisms of the Internal Market 
The creation of the single currency implies a direct reduction in trade barriers through the 
elimination of the cost of exchange rate transactions themselves and the elimination of 
the risks associated with exchange rate movements. In addition, it facilitates cross-border 
comparisons of prices, thereby enhancing market transparency and increasing 
competitive pressures. 
The creation of the EMU has reinforced the integration and the competition effects of the 
Internal Market by reducing the costs of cross-border activities (elimination of the costs 
of managing multiple currencies and of exchange rate risks) and by increasing the 
transparency of prices (see Box 2.2). However, the relations between EMU and the Single 
Market go in both directions. A well functioning and flexible Internal Market which 
allows for a rapid market based adjustment in the case of shocks is essential for a smooth 
functioning of EMU. More competitive product markets are essential in ensuring price 
and wage flexibility in EMU. 
Box 2.2: THE INTEGRATION EFFECTS OF THE EURO 
Reduction of transaction costs: A single currency allows exporters or customers to save on the 
transaction costs associated with the management of multiple currencies. Transaction costs include 
conversion charges on the spot exchange rate market, the cost of hedging against currency fluctuations, in-
house costs associated with the management of multiple currencies and banking charges on cross-border 
payments. 
Elimination of exchange rate risks: The competitive positions of companies can no longer be overturned 
by exchange-rate movements but will reflect productivity, cost and inflation differentials. This makes a big 
difference with the past, where hedging was the mean to reduce exchange rate risks. In practice, exporters 
cannot insure themselves adequately against all forms of exchange rate risks. In particular, hedging can be 
more costly for currencies which are not traded intensively on world financial markets. In addition, 
available hedging instruments are essentially of a short-term nature. Trade is mainly affected by medium to 
long-term fluctuations in real exchange rates against which hedging is difficult.  
Increased market transparency: The elimination of the national currencies and the introduction of a 
single currency make the prices of the participating Member Sates directly comparable. It thereby 
enhances cross-border competition and increases trade flows. This greater price transparency should allow 
(i) a reduction in information cost and facilitated cross-border arbitrage; (ii) a better allocation of capital 
and of available resources; (iii) a better exposure of the costs of structural rigidities as reflected in relative 
prices international; and (iv) a more effective comparison of balance sheets, mergers, acquisitions and 
alliances at Union level.  
2.2.2. The Internal Market as an instrument for rapid adjustment in the EMU 
For euro area countries the instruments of an independent monetary policy and exchange 
rate realignments are no longer available and the use of their fiscal policy is limited by 
the Stability and Growth Pact. In the absence of national monetary policy, or the use of 
other instruments, the adjustment process that brings cyclical conditions back in line with 
the euro area average uses the so-called "competitiveness channel"
3. As the national 
economy enters a boom phase relative to the euro area average, for example, the 
pressures on resources causes costs to increase; the real effective exchange rate 
appreciates; and this in turn slows activity until cyclical conditions move back in line 
with the euro area average. 
                                                 
3 See: European Commission (2006h). 
21There is significant scope for polices to influence the adjustment process through the 
fiscal stance and, over the medium-term, structural polices. The main role of structural 
reforms is to speed up this often slow adjustment process. Wage and price setting 
behaviour exerts an important influence of the speed and efficiency of adjustment. 
Recent surveys show that prices in the euro area change relatively infrequently. Prices of 
services are especially sticky, which is an indication of a lack of competition in services 
markets. Further structural reforms therefore appear to be needed to increase the 
responsiveness of domestic prices and wages to shocks. Even though the gap with the US 
has narrowed, euro area product and labour markets remain highly regulated. The 
creation of a more integrated and competitive Internal Market, particularly in services, 
should help ensure that prices adjust more rapidly to changing supply and demand 
conditions. More integrated markets also allow a more rapid dissipation of asymmetric 
shocks, as excess demand (or supply) for goods and services in one region within the 
euro area can by satisfied by supply (or demand) from another region. A more ambitious 
reform programme aimed at speeding up the process of adjustment via changes in prices, 
wages and production quantities in the euro area would therefore seem essential. 
From a longer term perspective, the adjustment to shocks requires moving production 
factors from declining sectors to sectors where the economy has a comparative advantage 
and where the factors can be used more efficiently. A more integrated Internal Market 
facilitates the reallocation of such factors, particularly in the case of more permanent 
supply shocks (such as technology shocks). This reallocation of resources can take place 
within industries via a process of entry and exit resulting in a shift in market shares 
towards most efficient firms. Alternatively it may occur via a process of industrial 
specialisation and geographic concentration reflecting the competitive advantages of 
countries or regions.  
A well functioning and flexible Internal Market which allows for a rapid market based 
adjustment to correct asymmetric shocks has, thus, gained in importance with the 
establishment of the EMU.  
Box 2.3: THE LISBON STRATEGY FOR GROWTH AND JOBS 
Despite the incontestable achievements of economic integration, the EU has failed to catch-up with the US 
in terms of economic performance. This is why in 2000 the EU heads of state and government decided to 
launch the Lisbon Strategy for Growth and Jobs. In comparison with the Internal Market, the Lisbon 
strategy was much wider in scope, foreseeing reforms in product, capital and labour markets as well as 
measures aimed at stimulating R&D and innovation. It encouraged Member States to accelerate the reform 
effort and valued a better co-ordination of the Member States' national reform agendas. In addition, it 
aimed to exploit the synergies between the different structural policy areas (the traditional areas such as 
labour and product markets, but also new areas like the knowledge-based economy, improvement of social 
conditions and the protection of the environment), and synergies between structural and macroeconomic 
policies. The Internal Market strategy was seen as an important element of the Lisbon Strategy. The 
breadth of its scope, however, clearly differentiated the Lisbon strategy from the earlier Community 
initiatives such as the SMP and EMU, which had more precisely defined objectives..  
2.2.3. Labour mobility as a tool of adjustment in EMU 
As explained above, the adjustment of a region or a country to asymmetric shocks can 
occur through a change in price competitiveness or through resource mobility. The latter 
requires moving production factors to firms, sectors or regions where the factors can be 
put to more efficient use. This is how labour mobility can help unwinding imbalances 
across countries, promoting the efficient allocation of labour while at the same time 
reducing labour shortages in high-employment regions.  
22In the US, labour mobility was the most important adjustment channel
4. Labour mobility 
accounted for the bulk of adjustment (after an initial increase in unemployment) while 
capital mobility and price and wage adjustments played a relatively minor role. In 
contrast, in Western Europe, a shock on employment was mainly absorbed by changes in 
labour force participation rather than labour mobility
5. 
Because of the limited role played by labour mobility in the EU, and especially in the 
euro area, enhancing the adjustment through migration is desirable. There is persistent 
dispersion of unemployment rates across countries and regions within them. European 
regions with skill shortages and low unemployment are often next to regions with skill or 
general labour surplus and high unemployment.  
The free movement of labour between Member States of the European Community was 
introduced in 1968 and was one of the principles underlying the 1992 Single Market 
Programme. Nevertheless, labour mobility has remained rather low. In the EU15, only 
0.1% of the working-age population change their country of residence in a given year. In 
the US, about 3 per cent of the working-age population moves to a different state every 
year. Labour mobility between the euro area Member States however, has slowed down 
considerably following the first oil price shock in 1973. It was much higher during the 
1950s and 1960s when northern European countries actively recruited workers from 
southern Europe and Ireland. Labour markets remain segmented, country by country. 
Within countries, regional mobility rates are around 1% of the total working-age 
population in 2005, with rates below 0.3% in several Member States.  
Compared to international migration from third countries, labour mobility within the EU 
is a limited phenomenon. The share of nationals from other Member States does not 
exceed 20 per cent of the total foreign working-age population and in general, a minority 
is from the EU10 Member States, see Figure 2-2.  
Figure  2-2:  Share of foreign nationals in percentage of resident working-age 
population, 2005 
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
Austria
Germany
Spain
Belgium
Ireland
EU-15
EU-25
UK
Greece
France
Sweden
Netherlands
Denmark
Portugal
Finland
EU-10
EU-15 EU-10 Non-EU
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The free movement of people and workers was probably the most significant dimension 
of economic integration to change after the EU enlargement in 2004, given that barriers 
                                                 
4 See: Blanchard and Katz (1992). 
5 See: Decressin and Fatas (1995). 
23to trade, foreign direct investment and other capital movements had already been largely 
removed. Large gaps in per capita income and wages across the enlarged EU provide 
high incentives for east-west mobility, which are likely to persist for quite some time; 
furthermore, geographical proximity and established historical and cultural ties may ease 
migration flows. As in previous enlargements, temporary arrangements for the free 
movement of workers have been agreed upon and included in the accession treaties to 
ensure a smooth process of integration.
 Since enlargement, there has been an increase in 
the number of EU8
6 workers in EU15 Member States. Overall, the percentage of EU8 
nationals in the resident population of each EU15 Member State was relatively stable 
before and after enlargement, with the exception of the UK and, more strikingly, Austria 
and Ireland where there was an increase. In EU15 countries maintaining transitory 
restrictions, typically, labour market access for workers from the new Member States has 
been governed by quota systems. 
2.3.  EU enlargement 
In parallel with the integration processes described above, several rounds of enlargement 
have taken place, leading to the expansion of the Single Market. The recent accession of 
ten new Member States substantially increased the size of the Internal Market, while 
constituting at the same time a challenge to its proper functioning. On the one hand, the 
accession of the central and eastern European countries has increased the pool of 
consumers and has provided firms with additional opportunities to draw on a wider range 
of comparative advantages characterising the different Member States. This is a source of 
further dynamism and efficiency in the Internal Market. On the other hand, while the 
economic changes induced by this enlargement have been absorbed quite smoothly and 
there is no evidence of disruptive impacts on the product and labour markets, the 
increased divergence among the EU25 members has augmented the risks of tensions 
within the Internal Market, such as in the areas of the opening up of services markets, tax 
competition and migration flows. 
A Commission study
7 reviewed the economic dimension of the 2004 enlargement. It 
concluded that the enlarged Internal Market has become, despite the increased economic 
divergence among its current members, more integrated and dynamic. In particular, the 
accession of the central and eastern European countries has increased the potential 
benefits of the Internal Market. It has increased the pool of consumers but it also 
provides firms with additional opportunities to draw on the wider range of comparative 
advantages that characterise the different Member States. Hence, enlargement contributes 
to a more dynamic and efficient Internal Market leading to a stronger European economy 
that is better equipped to face the increasing global competition. 
2.4.  Demographic change 
The EU will undergo unprecedented demographic change in coming decades: over the 
period 2004 to 2050, fertility rates are expected to remain well below the natural 
replacement rate of 2.1 children per woman, and life expectancy is projected to continue 
to increase by about one year and a half per decade
8.
 Demographic changes under way 
also mean that the working-age population in Europe will start to shrink from 2010 
                                                 
6 These Member States are: Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia and 
Slovenia. 
7 See: European Commission (2006a).  
8 See: Eurostat (2005). 
24onwards. The Commission projects that the working-age population (15 to 64) will 
decline by 16% (or 48 million) by 2050 while the elderly population (aged 65 and +) will 
rise sharply by 77% (or 58 million).
9 In order to maintain and further improve the living 
standards of its ageing population Europe will have to use its human resources more 
efficiently. Achieving the benefits from an optimal allocation of workers across jobs, 
sectors and regions is becoming increasingly important. The Internal Market can 
contribute to this by giving workers the freedom to move between EU Member States.  
The effects of ageing populations can also be offset to some extent by immigration from 
third countries.
 Net immigration flows are projected to hover around 0.2% of the total EU 
population which on its own will not solve the problems linked to ageing. Moreover, 
population ageing affects migrants themselves, as they get older and their fertility 
patterns tend to resemble those in their host country. Nevertheless, immigration may 
have positive effects on the functioning of the Internal Market by relieving the labour 
shortages in certain areas. New jobs can be created, for example in the construction 
sector, domestic services and hotels and restaurants. Highly skilled immigrants can bring 
scientific, technical and innovative skills that expand the production capabilities of the 
economy
10, thereby contributing to the creation of new industries and the increase in long 
term growth through human capital accumulation. Market efficiency may also increase 
with immigration
11. Indeed, immigrants are very responsive to regional differences in 
economic opportunities. New immigrants in the US are found more likely to be clustered 
in the states where wages are the highest for the type of skills they offer, thus "greasing 
the wheels of the labour market". Immigration could have a potential role in improving 
the market efficiency by compensating, at least partially, for the low mobility of natives.  
2.5.  Increased importance of services  
The character of the Internal Market has also been changed by an increased focus in 
policy development on services and network industries. The broadening of the scope of 
the Internal Market (which under the Single Market Programme was rather more 
narrowly focused on manufacturing industries) reflects the growing economic 
importance of the services sectors. Services now account for around 70% of employment 
and value added in the EU. However, they are responsible for only 20% of intra-EU 
trade. This relatively low figure reflects the low tradability of services in general but also 
the continued existence of regulatory barriers within the Internal Market.  
Due to their intangibility services tend to be affected by more complex regulatory 
barriers than trade. Unlike goods, they often require business processes and the presence 
of the provider in both Member States: in that of the service provider and in that of the 
delivery. This double presence can result in the duplication of regulatory requirements 
and burdens (national social security schemes for the staff, different administrative and 
tax procedures, etc.). In addition, foreign firms often face additional costs due to the non-
acknowledgement of their compliance with their home country regulation
12, and there is 
often a lack of clarity on the regulations and their effective implementation, resulting in 
                                                 
9 See: European Commission (2006j). 
10 See: Freeman (2006). 
11 As suggested by Borjas (2001). 
12  Companies might have to provide professional (re-) qualifications, meet economic tests, and sometimes 
need to have the residence or even nationality of the owner or manager of the firm in the member state 
where the service is delivered, or for some branches geographical or quantitative limitations of 
establishment still exist. 
25legal and economic uncertainty for foreign service providers. This regulation 
heterogeneity severely restricts the realisation of economies of scale in complying with 
regulations within the EU.  
From a competition perspective, the negative consequences of the low tradability of 
services can to a certain extent be offset by ensuring the freedom of establishment for 
service providers and by a simplification and harmonisation of regulatory requirements. 
The Services Directive, which was adopted towards the end of 2006, aims to enhance 
competition and growth by encouraging the cross-border provision of services, either via 
trade or the local establishment of competing service providers. At the same time 
tradability and competition in services is increasing at world level, mostly as a result of a 
fragmentation of production processes made possible by the development of new 
Information and Communication Technologies (ICT).  
Improving effective competition in network industries has wider benefits, as these 
sectors provide inputs to a large number of other economic activities. While significant 
progress has been made in terms of market liberalisation (particularly in the air transport 
and telecom sectors and to a lesser extent in postal services, energy and rail transport) the 
goal of full market integration is still a long way off for all these sectors. This is reflected 
in the still significant price differences between Member States. The first step in 
fostering market integration in network industries is to ensure that the physical 
infrastructure for integration is in place. This is for example the case in air travel, 
telecommunications and postal services where a well established Europe-wide network 
already exists. This contrasts sharply with the electricity and gas sectors, where the 
necessary interconnection capacity between countries is still insufficient. Until the 
physical infrastructure is in place, the scope for a well functioning Internal Market 
remains severely restricted. 
2.6.  Globalisation 
A number of large and rapidly growing markets, particularly in Asia, have started to be 
opened up to European companies. In order to be competitive in these new markets EU 
firms need to have a sound home base, which provides incentives for firms to improve 
efficiency and innovative performance. The enlarged Internal Market has the potential to 
develop into such a home base. Already it offers a number of benefits. First, as a source 
of sophisticated and innovation-driven demand, the Internal Market provides the 
incentive for EU producers to become increasingly specialised in high-value added 
production.  Second, the Internal Market offers the opportunity to exploit economies of 
scale in R&D, innovation, production and advertising. The adoption of common 
standards within the EU and worldwide is also important in this respect. Third, the 
Internal Market makes the EU a more attractive location to do business. By attracting 
inward FDI, the Internal Market encourages the diffusion of new technologies developed 
elsewhere. Finally, as increasing trade openness puts added downward pressure on the 
prices of imported products, only a well functioning Internal Market will ensure that this 
will be translated into lower retail prices across all EU markets, leading eventually to 
benefits to EU consumers and higher economic growth. 
Not only will a well functioning and open Internal Market increase economic growth and 
employment levels inside the EU, but it also helps European business to compete 
successfully in the global marketplace. First, as indicated above, the competitive position 
of EU business improves as a result of the learning process involved in competing in the 
Internal Market, allowing EU firms to more successfully exploit opportunities and 
26compete in markets abroad. Secondly, globalisation is providing an opportunity to export 
and promote Internal Market standards abroad for example in the field of environmental 
protection. This is taking place whilst the EU is simultaneously seeking convergence 
upon high quality regulatory standards from abroad. Thirdly, as the pace of global 
economic change increases, with the emergence of China, India and other emerging 
markets, the consolidation of the Internal Market will give EU Member States the 
possibility to present a common position in global economic forums based on shared 
economic goals. 
3.  EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ON THE EFFECTS OF THE INTERNAL MARKET  
This chapter describes the expected economic effects of deepening EU economic 
integration associated with the removal of non-tariff barriers to trade and cross-border 
activities and with the introduction of a single currency. Section 3.1 presents the 
expected microeconomic effects and compares these expectations with the available 
empirical evidence on the results achieved so far. Section 3.2 provides an updated 
estimate of the macroeconomic effects of product market integration taking into account 
the most recent enlargement. 
3.1.  Microeconomic effects 
The consolidation of the Internal Market and the introduction of the euro are expected to 
deliver welfare gains that result from associated profound micro-economic changes, 
notably in terms of competition pressure, price setting behaviour of firms and changes in 
specialisation patterns (see Box 3.1). 
The reduced barriers to cross-border flows of products and factors and the associated 
increase in price transparency across Member States reinforce competition pressures 
within the EU and contribute to higher productivity levels and greater competitiveness 
via three main channels: (i) increased allocative efficiency, which results from forcing 
firms to set prices lower and closer to marginal costs, reducing monopoly rents and 
distortions in the allocation of resources while pushing total output closer to the social 
optimum level; (ii) increased productive efficiency, due to the fact that inefficiencies are 
more strongly penalised in the marketplace; (iii) enhanced dynamic efficiency, which 
results from the greater incentives to invest in the adoption and development of product 
and process innovations. 
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Box 3.1: THE IMPACT OF PRODUCT MARKET INTEGRATION ON MICRO-ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 
To better understand the full impact of integration on economic performance, a distinction is made 
between short-term effects on the permeability of markets, medium-term effects on the behaviour of firms 
and longer-term effect on the organisation of industry, the structure of the economy and innovation 
performance
13.  
(1) Competition effects 
The removal of barriers to intra-EU product and factor flows facilitates firm entry and the introduction of 
new brands in the various national markets, leading to an increase in inter-brand competition. This results 
in an increase in allocative efficiency and declining prices and profit margins. The EMU by increasing 
cross border price transparency and increasing intra-brand competition has further reduced firms' ability to 
exploit market power via price discrimination strategies. This effect is further reinforced by the growing 
importance of electronic commerce that minimises cross border search costs.  
(2) Firms' behaviour 
In reaction to the increased competition pressure and to restore their profit margins firms may decide to 
modify their strategy in different ways: i) by reducing production costs, which can be achieved by 
concentrating on the activities where their competitive position is strongest ('core business') or/and by 
exploiting further economies of scale by expanding in new geographical markets; ii) by regaining market 
power via increasing product differentiation.
14 As this requires costly investments, the latter strategy is also 
likely to lead firms to concentrate resources on core business activities.
15 
(3) Effects on the structure of industry 
The longer-run implications of the changes in the behaviour of firms are not straightforward: 
•  Industrial concentration levels, within each Member State, are likely to decline as firms from other 
Member States enter the market
16. However, at EU level, concentration may increase because mutual 
entry does not lead to an increase in the total number of firms. Nevertheless, firms are expected to 
compete more intensely across borders.  
•  The impact on industrial specialisation results from two forces working in opposite directions. The 
reduction in cross-border transaction costs allows for greater exploitation of scale economies and 
therefore promotes inter-industry specialisation among Member States.
17 However, since integration 
promotes convergence in income levels and factor endowments among Member States and the 
elimination of exchange rate fluctuations reduces uncertainty associated with cross-border transactions, 
intra-industry trade (hence reducing industrial specialisation) could rise.
1819  
• The  location of production is also affected as firms expand activities beyond their home markets. "New 
Economic Geography" arguments claim that due to the exploitation of agglomeration economies 
production would become more concentrated in core regions which are closest to the largest markets
20. 
However, the concentration in the core leads to an increase in the prices of immobile production factors 
                                                 
13   See: Dierx, Ilzkovitz and Sekkat (2004). 
14   Another option, facilitated by the increased price transparency, would be to come to a tacit agreement 
amongst producers and distributors to set high prices. However, the increased risks of collusion can be 
counteracted by an effective application of competition policy. 
15   In the medium-term we will then expect to observe a decline in sectoral diversification at the firm level. 
16   Assuming that, it is not offset by market exit or takeover of national firms. 
17   Making them in the process more vulnerable to asymmetric shocks, see Krugman (1991a and 1991b). 
18   See: Frankel and Rose (1997), Fontagné and Freudenberg (1999) and European Commission (1996 and 
1997). 
19   The empirical evidence available supports both claims. While production specialisation has risen since 
the early 1980s, export specialisation has remained more or less unchanged and there has been a 
notable increase in the relative importance of intra-industry trade. 
20   See: Krugman (1991a and 1991b). 
28and congestion costs are pushed up. As intra-EU trade barriers are reduced further, a re-dispersion of 
economic activity across the EU may occur, changing the specialisation patterns of countries and 
regions. 
(4) Innovation effects 
Product market integration can also lead to dynamic gains by stimulating innovation and the diffusion of 
innovation: first, the pressures of competition stimulate innovation because the risks of being eliminated 
from the market are higher; second, the creation of an Internal Market allows writing off the fixed R&D 
costs over a larger volume of production; and third, technology transfer and diffusion are stimulated via 
the increased FDI flows. 
While it is still too early to draw definite conclusions about longer-term effects, existing 
empirical evidence allows a first investigation of the short and medium term changes 
triggered by the integration process. What emerges from the available evidence is 
somewhat of a mixed picture: while the Internal Market has helped to promote 
integration and, to a certain extent, competition within the EU, it has been relatively 
ineffective as a driver of innovation. The potential of the Internal Market has therefore 
not yet been fully exploited. 
3.1.1. Market Integration  
The Internal Market, but also EMU and enlargement, have helped to reinforce the 
integration of European product markets. However, the empirical evidence gathered in 
this section shows that the pace of European market integration appears to have slowed 
down in recent years.  
 
3.1.1.1.  Trade flows 
Despite the ongoing efforts to eliminate all remaining barriers to cross-border 
transactions within the EU, integration as measured by the ratio of intra-EU trade flows 
of goods to GDP seems to have lost momentum since 2000, particularly among the 
EU15, after increasing noticeably in the late 1990s. 
The ratio of intra-EU25 manufacturing trade to GDP increased strongly in the second 
half of the 1990s (particularly from 1998 onwards) fuelled by trade growth between the 
EU15 and the Central and Eastern European countries during the run up to the EU 
accession of the latter. An increase of intra EU15 trade as a share of GDP was also 
observed until 2000, which can be interpreted as an effect of the gradual implementation 
of the Internal Market acquis (see Figure 3-1). 
29Figure 3-1:  Ratio of intra and extra-EU manufacturing trade to GDP (%) 
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However, since 2000 the trade effect of the enlargement process and particularly intra-
EU15 trade integration, seem to have stalled. While, by 2005, the GDP share of intra-
EU25 trade had bounced back from the slump observed in 2002-2003 it was nonetheless 
only marginally above the peak level of 2000. The ratio of intra-EU15 trade to GDP in 
2005 still remained below the 2000 peak. 
This period of slowdown in trade integration coincided with the introduction of the single 
currency. While it is still too early for a definite evaluation, there is wide agreement that 
the euro nevertheless has had a positive impact on trade integration. Estimates point to an 
increase in intra-euro-zone trade of 5% to 10% that can be attributed the introduction of 
the euro
21. In fact, it is possible to observe an increasing trend in the share of intra-euro-
zone trade in total intra EU15 trade, confirming the importance of the euro as an 
instrument to push forward the ongoing process of deepening economic integration 
within the EU (see Figure 3-2). The trade boosting effect of the introduction of the euro 
has however been far less pronounced than the trade effect of enlargement as illustrated 
by the decreasing ratio of intra euro-zone trade to intra-EU25 trade since 1998. 
                                                 
21   See: Baldwin (2006). 
30Figure  3-2:    Ratio of intra euro-zone trade over intra EU15 and intra EU25 
manufacturing trade (%) 
 
Source: Eurostat 
 
Despite the evidence pointing to a trade boosting effect associated with the introduction 
of the euro, in 2005 trade among euro-area members (as a ratio of GDP) was still below 
the level of 2000. This suggests that the trade boosting effect of the single currency has 
not been able to offset the dampening effect of the relatively subdued economic growth 
in the euro-zone vis-à-vis other economies since 2000. 
 
Figure 3-3:   Intra trade in manufactured products (intra exports as % of GDP) 
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31The slowdown of trade growth within the EU15 and euro-zone relative to trade growth 
with third partners is unsurprising given the already very intense trade flows within the 
EU15 and the large untapped opportunities for trade gains with third partners. However 
the potential for trade integration in the euro-zone is far from exhausted. A comparison 
with the US clearly shows that there is room for further progress (see Figure 3-3). Using 
the latest data available (2001/2002), we find that the ratio of manufacturing exports 
among US states to GDP (33%) was more than a third higher than the corresponding 
ratio for the euro-area (20%). 
Figure 3-4:  Services and manufactured goods trade in 2004 (as a % of GDP) 
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Particularly in services there is still plenty of scope for further trade integration. The 
available data (see Figure 3-4) clearly show that the Internal Market does not yet fully 
play its role in the services sectors. While services are less tradable by nature, there is 
little difference between trade between EU25 Member States and trade between the EU 
and third countries. This clearly contrasts with manufacturing where intra EU trade 
clearly dominates.  
 
3.1.1.2.  FDI flows 
The link between EU economic integration and FDI flows is not straightforward. A priori 
the absence of substantial differences in factor endowments across Member States 
prevents large scale shifts in the location of industries associated with inter-industrial 
specialisation and intermediate trade based on differences in terms of comparative 
advantages
22 . Hence, the Internal Market can be expected to have a stronger impact in 
terms of promoting cross-border trade rather than intra-EU FDI flows associated with 
multi-plant production. However as the Internal Market Programme and the EMU reduce 
trade costs, the existing site-specific location advantages and agglomeration economies 
may lead to higher geographic concentration of production in certain industries. This can 
                                                 
22  While phenomena of outsourcing of labour intensive parts of the production process to lower wage 
Member States have been identified, they remain relatively small. For example, European 
Restructuring Monitor's survey data show that since 2002 only around 9% of restructuring cases were 
associated with the relocation of activities. For a more detailed overview of available evidence, see: 
European Commission (2005a). 
32lead to temporary a boost in intra-EU FDI activity as firms concentrate previously 
dispersed activities in the location that they find to be the most suitable. In services, 
particularly in the non-tradable sectors, FDI oriented towards serving local markets is 
expected to increase as cross-border investments become the main option of market entry 
across the EU following opening of these sectors to cross-border competition
23. 
Overall, in the years following the implementation of the Internal Market Programme 
FDI activity in the EU15 has increased. Consequently, the accumulated stocks of inward 
and outward FDI have expanded spectacularly over the past decade (see Figure 3-5). 
However, the total stocks of inward and outward FDI increased only marginally with the 
EU enlargement from 15 to 25 Member States, as FDI in the new Member States is 
responsible for only a small share of total FDI in the EU25. Nonetheless, inward FDI 
accounts for an increasing share of GDP in the new Member States (around 40% in 
2004/5), playing an important role in their process of economic modernisation
24. 
Figure 3-5:  FDI Outward and Inward Stocks in the EU15 and EU25
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Source: Eurostat 
 
It is difficult to disentangle the effects of the Internal Market (associated with the 
consolidation of many European industries and in particular with the deregulation and 
liberalisation of network industries) from broader phenomena like globalisation and 
factors of a cyclical nature like the stock market boom of the nineties, the subsequent 
burst of the dot com bubble and the weakness of the exchange rate of the euro in the 
early 1990s. However, the increasing share of intra-EU FDI flows in total EU FDI 
activity suggests that the Internal Market had a role to play. In 1995 50% of total FDI 
outflows and 53% of total FDI inflows in the EU15 originated from other EU15 
countries. Ten years later these shares had grown to 66% and 78% respectively
26. Further 
Internal Market reforms, namely aimed at deregulating and removing barriers to entry in 
the services are likely to foster additional intra-EU FDI activity as EU firms are given the 
incentive to reorganise in order to better serve the integrated market. 
                                                 
23   As well as in sectors where trade costs are relatively important in total production costs. 
24   For more detailed analysis see: European Commission (2006a). 
25   FDI stocks in bn Euro. 
26   In 2005, intra-EU25 FDI represented 70% and 82% of total outflows and inflows respectively. 
33Figure 3-6:     Share of EU15 in total FDI outflows and inflows (1995-2005) 
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The FDI effect of the EMU is difficult to separate from that of the Internal Market. Since 
1999 the declining trend of the share of the euro-zone economies in the total EU15 
inward and outflows FDI flows seems to have been halted. This suggests that the 
common currency may have triggered some additional dynamism in FDI activity. While 
this confirms the findings of existing academic research, the quantified estimates of this 
effect remain uncertain
27. Some studies conducted so far find evidence of considerable 
positive effects of the EMU on FDI activity. Some empirical evidence points to increases 
in intra euro-area FDI inflows as high as 42% directly attributable to the EMU. 
Furthermore, there is evidence of positive effects on FDI flows from and to non-EMU 
economies.  
Figure 3-7:   Share of the euro-zone in EU15 flows (%)
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27   For a summary of results, see: Petroulas (2004), de Sousa and Lochard (2004), Economist Intelligence 
Unit (2004) and Machin (2004), European Commission (2004a). 
28  In 1995 and 1997 no data are available for Greece and Ireland. In 1999 no data are available for 
Greece. 
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3.1.1.3. Mergers and Acquisitions 
The Internal Market is expected to be associated with increased Mergers and 
Acquisitions (M&A) activity as the process of consolidation and restructuring in many 
industries is triggered by the increased pressure of competition
29. M&A are therefore 
expected to increase both within and between Member States as firms reorganise 
activities in order to restore profit margins. The added opportunities to do business 
abroad may also trigger cross-border M&A as firms seek to expand their markets
30.  
 
These claims are supported by the available evidence showing that in the late 1980s the 
introduction of the Internal Market Programme coincided with a M&A wave, largely 
fuelled by cross-border acquisitions of EU firms (both intra-EU deals and acquisitions by 
non-EU companies). The fact that in this period cross-border M&A increased at a much 
faster rate than domestic M&A suggests that they were increasingly used as a channel for 
market access rather than as a means for domestic restructuring. The data also suggest 
that the EMU provided added incentives for M&A operations within the euro-area. The 
share of the euro-area in the total number of cross-border acquisitions by euro zone firms 
increased from 34% in 1999 to 42% in 2004 despite the sluggish economic growth in the 
euro-area; this increase in M&A activity reversed the downward trend observed since the 
early 1990s (see Figure 3-8). However, the latest data suggest that this might have been a 
temporary phenomenon as this ratio declined in 2005 to the 2000 level. Meanwhile the 
2004 enlargement triggered an increase of M&A operations in the new Member States. 
The share of M&A involving firms in the new Member States and the EU15 in total 
M&A involving EU15 firms increased from 6% in 1992 to 17% in 2003
31. 
 
                                                 
29   85% of FDI flows worldwide were M&A which illustrates well their importance as channels for market 
integration. 
30   As an indicator for market integration cross-border M&A activity is however imperfect, as it overlooks 
the possibility of anti-competitive motives behind cross-border mergers, some of which may aim to 
keep markets segmented and to eliminate potential or actual competitors. 
31   See: Garnier, G. (2006). 
35Figure 3-8:    Intra euro-zone cross-border M&A as a share the total number of the 
cross-border acquisitions by euro-zone companies  
 
Source:  Own calculation based on Thomson Finalcial Services 
 
Cross-border M&A are especially important to boost market integration in deregulated 
network industries as they give firms the possibility to expand beyond their traditional 
domestic markets by acquiring or merging with local firms. Two effects in the M&A 
activity in EU network industries can be expected. First, following the break-up or 
privatisation of former monopolies, an increase in (absolute and relative) M&A activity 
is expected. Second, the reduction in market barriers may lead to an increase in the share 
of cross-border M&A in total EU deals.  
An analysis of the data between 1993 and 2005 confirms both effects to some extent, 
even after allowance is made for the effect of the merger wave of the late 1990s
32. The 
share of the network industries in the overall number of EU25 M&A deals grew 
considerably – from 4.3% in 1993 to 9.2% in 2005, while their share in terms of value 
rose from 20% to 27%
33 (see Figure 3.9). The share of intra-EU cross-border deals in the 
total number of M&A in these sectors has increased from 15-20% of all M&A in the 
mid-1990s to over 25% more recently. Despite this positive evolution, the integration of 
markets in these sectors remains still limited and incumbents continue to dominate 
domestic markets. 
 
                                                 
32   See: European Commission (2006b). 
33  While the majority of deals covered in this analysis are of a small size, the aggregated values are 
typically dominated by very few large-scale deals, often involving incumbents or major firms. For 
instance, about 60% of the value of M&A deals in network industries recorded in 2000 can be 
attributed to two cross-border deals only. These large deals also explain the year-on-year fluctuations in 
aggregate values. 
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36Figure 3-9:   Evolution of the share of cross-border (intra EU) deals in network 
industries  
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3.1.2. Price dispersion and price levels 
The increased market integration has accelerated price convergence among EU Member 
States. The coefficient of variation of comparative price levels of final consumption 
(including indirect taxes) across the EU15 has decreased from 20% in 1991 (before the 
launch of the Single Act) to 13% in 2005 (see Figure 3-10). In the EU25 progress has 
been even more remarkable as the new Member States become increasingly integrated 
with the rest of the EU and progressively adopt the Internal Market acquis. For the EU25 
the coefficient of price variation dropped from 39% in 1995 to 26% in 2005. While this 
coefficient dropped by 4.8 percentage points between 1995 and 2005 in the EU15, it 
decreased by 13.3 percentage points in the EU25 as a whole over the same period. 
 
37Figure 3-10:   Price convergence between EU Member States 
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Within the EU two opposite trends underlie this process of price convergence (see Figure 
3-11). First, across most high income EU15 Member States inflation levels have declined 
and price levels converged downwards towards the EU25 average. This can be partially 
attributed to the ECB monetary policy, the increased access to cheaper imports from 
across the world, and the higher price transparency associated with the introduction of 
the euro. The Internal Marker has also had an important role in adding to the downward 
pressure on prices as it allowed for tougher competition in product and factor markets 
across the EU.  
Second, in the new Member States and in the lower income EU15 Member States price 
levels have converged upwards towards the EU25 average
34. While integration and 
competition enhancing reforms have had disciplinary effect on firms' pricing strategies, 
the increased trade with higher income economies, improved production quality and the 
Balassa-Samuelson effect associated with the income convergence have pushed price 
levels up. 
 
                                                 
34  Some high income Members States like Ireland, Italy and the UK, have also experienced noticeable 
price level increases. Their price levels at the start of the period under analysis were the lowest among 
the higher income Member States.  
38Figure 3-11:  Variation in price levels 1995-2005 (EU25=100) 
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Source: Eurostat 
 
Despite the positive evidence indicating that EU market integration has been 
accompanied by a process of price level convergence, it is clear from the available 
evidence that this process, particularly within the EU15, has slowed down in recent 
years. The coefficient of variation of comparative price levels of final consumption 
(including indirect taxes) decreased by 1.6 points between 2000 and 2005 while it had 
fallen by 3.8 points in the period 1995-1999. While the EMU has been a crucial step to 
increase in transparency, it does not seem to have added much dynamism to price 
convergence. In 2005 the coefficient of price variation across the euro-zone equalled 
11%, which was only slightly below the coefficient for the EU15
35. 
The slowdown in price convergence among the EU15 and the euro-zone is not 
unexpected. Following the completion of the Single Market Programme, a significant 
price convergence was visible for the core EU countries, that is, countries with relatively 
stable exchange rates
36. In addition, price levels in the euro-zone (and in the EU15) are 
already much more harmonised than across the EU25 and much of the remaining 
dispersion is associated with differences in indirect taxation and structural factors 
including factors such as transport costs and differences in tastes.  
A comparison with the US (a large integrated market of comparable size to the EU which 
can be used as a benchmark) on the basis of price data for individual products confirms 
that overall the process of price convergence particularly within the EMU is close to 
being exhausted. In 2001, the level of traded goods price dispersion in the euro-area was 
already very close to that of the US (while remaining clearly higher in "Europe")
37. 
                                                 
35   Since 1995 the euro-zone coefficient of price variation has declined by 5.8 percentage points, which is 
roughly comparable to the evolution within the EU15. 
36   See: Gasoriek et al. (2004). 
37   See Rogers (2002). In the study non-tradeable products broadly match services. Data for EMU 
excludes Greece and data for " Europe" include observation in cities located in the EU15 but also the 
Swiss cities of Geneva and Zurich and Oslo. No city data from the new Member States is included in 
the sample. 
39Furthermore, price dispersion among non-tradeables, while higher than for tradeables, 
was already lower than in the US (where dispersion driven by heterogeneous housing 
price developments across US metropolitan areas increased). 
However, some further progress in terms of price convergence can be still expected due 
to deregulation and ICT development, which have greatly increased the scope for 
tradability and arbitrage in services
38. Despite some convergence observed since 1999, 
price dispersion in services remains relatively high (see Table 3-1). In non-durable goods 
(characterised by low scope for long-distance trading like services), the coefficient of 
variation of comparative price levels also remains higher than that of durable and semi-
durable goods. 
 
Table 3-1:  Price convergence between EU25 Member States: breakdown by 
product categories
39  
 
  1999  2000  2001 2002 2003  2004p 
Non-durable  goods  27.3%  25.3%  24.4% 24.0% 25.4% 23.8% 
Semi-durable goods  18.2%  15.9%  14.5% 14.9% 11.8% 11.8% 
Durable  goods  15.6%  14.0%  13.0% 13.8% 13.8% 14.4% 
Consumer  services  42.2%  40.4%  38.0% 38.0% 37.0% 36.2% 
Source: Own calculations based on Eurostat data 
While the intrinsic characteristics of production remain important obstacles to further 
progress in price convergence across the EU, the relatively slow pace of market 
integration also play an important role, namely in the case of network industries 
(telecommunications, postal services, electricity, gas, airlines and public transport)
40. 
Market integration in these sectors which were formerly sheltered from domestic and 
foreign competition should, as a result of arbitrage activities, lead to price convergence 
or at least to parallel price movements across Member States
41. However, despite the 
ongoing efforts towards market integration prices in network industries still vary greatly 
across Member States, reflecting to some extent their different degree of market 
deregulation.  
In the telecommunications sector the coefficients of variation of price levels, notably for 
international and European calls are the highest among the network industries. Between 
2000 and 2005 prices seem to have converged for local calls. For international calls and 
calls within the EU there has been some progress towards convergence after 2003 while 
for national calls price level dispersion across the EU has increased over the same 
period
42. In the electricity and gas sectors intra-EU price differences are much lower but 
not much progress towards convergence has been achieved since 2000.
43 
                                                 
38   See: European Commission (2001a). 
39   Coefficient of variation using comparative price levels for ESA95 aggregates.  
40   See: European Commission (2006b). 
41  Price (net of transport costs) differences are likely to persist even in completely integrated markets – 
for example due to different production structures (including the content of local services) or the cost 
of supplying services of general interest, which will generally be higher in less densely populated 
countries.  
42   This result is highly influenced by the very sharp price increase in Latvia in 2005. Telecommunications 
price disparity in general during this period can be greatly affected by since they may be seriously 
40 
Table  3-2:  Price dispersion (coefficient of variation) in different network 
industries in the EU25
44 
 
 
2000 2001 2002  2003 2004 2005 2006 
 
Electricity 
  
Industry (annual 
consumption: 2000 Mwh)  n.a.  20.3% 15.0%  17.0% 19.9% 18.1% 18.3% 
Households (annual 
comsumption:3500 kWh)  n.a.  25.6% 21.0%  22.3% 23.3% 23.5% 22.9% 
 
Gas 
 
Industry (annual 
consumption :41860GJ )  n.a.  22.4% 16.8%  13.4% 13.7% 16.8% 19.5% 
Households (annual 
consumption: 83.70 GJ)  n.a.  24.4% 18.3%  18.3% 17.3% 17.4% 17.9% 
 
Telecommunications 
 
Local calls  28.9% 29.2% 27.9%  28.1% 21.5% 24.4% n.a. 
National calls  28.8% 28.5% 26.7%  26.3% 35.1% 39.4% n.a. 
International calls 
(to near EU country)  50.3% 63.7% 69.7%  70.7% 61.6% 66.2% n.a. 
International calls (US)  51.7% 64.1% 69.4%  70.6% 37.3% 38.0% n.a. 
 
Source: European Commission (2006b) 
 
 
While the speed of price convergence in these sectors is not straightforward to explain 
due to the interaction of many explanatory factors, the insufficient market integration 
across Members States can be identified as contributing to the slow progress observed 
until now
45. Even when all legal barriers to trade are removed, market access remains 
hampered by insufficient cross border interconnecting infrastructures. This factor also 
adds to cross border price differences as it leads to congestion costs which are passed on 
to consumers. 
                                                                                                                                                 
distorted by tariff-rebalancing, which is a necessary step towards the restructuring of the sector but that 
cannot be directly attributed to the progress achieved in terms of market integration. 
43   The recent rise in oil and gas prices is a factor that must be taken into account when interpreting these 
results. While in principle such price rises constitute a common external shock, their effects are 
asymmetric due to differences in the production structures across Member States namely the degree of 
reliance on those products as inputs. Nevertheless they might also reflect insufficient progress in 
market integration as they also point different the ability of Member States to pass external price 
shocks through to customers. 
44   Data refers to the period 2001-2006 in the case of electricity and gas and to the period 2000-2005 in the 
case of the telecommunication industries. Prices are indicated in €-cent/kWh excl. taxes (electricity), 
€/GJ excl. taxes (gas) and in € per 10 min call, VAT incl. (telecommunications). The average and the 
coefficient of variation are weighted by HICP-weights. Gas prices are not available for Greece, Cyprus, 
Malta and Finland (households). Source: Eurostat (Electricity and Gas), Teligen Ltd. 
(Telecommunications). 
45   Co-movements of prices (i.e. convergence in inflation rates), could be also used as indicators of price 
convergence. The available evidence given by the patterns of sectoral HICP-indices in Member States 
suggest that these do not seem be occurring either.  
413.1.3. Competition   
Despite the recent slowdown in market integration and price convergence there is clear 
evidence that the Internal Market and the EMU have changed the conditions of 
competition in the EU by facilitating market entry by new firms and by reducing the 
ability of European firms to segment national markets geographically. The resulting 
increase in competition pressure is reflected in the observed greater instability in market 
leadership, contributed to market entry on national markets and led to change in the 
pricing strategies of firms. However, the EU product markets remain heavily regulated, 
business dynamism is insufficient and prices rigidities are persistent. 
 
3.1.3.1. Turbulence in market leadership, reduction in price-cost margins and increased 
efficiency  
The increased market integration has modified market conditions in many industries 
across the EU. Considerable turbulence in market leadership in EU manufacturing was 
observed between 1987 and 2000; by 2000 the leading top five companies had lost more 
than half of their production share to other firms and in many sectors a new market leader 
had emerged
46. The changed market conditions have led to reductions in mark-ups, 
particularly in the sectors most affected by the Single Market Programme
47. There is 
evidence pointing to an average reduction of 3.9 percentage points in price-cost margins 
in these sectors in the 1990s
48. 
Box 3.2:  PRICE REDUCTIONS IN SOME NETWORK INDUSTRIES 
An empirical study
49, carried out by Copenhagen Economics for the Commission, examined the link 
between market opening and price performance. For most network industries the study finds a negative 
relationship, implying that market opening has led to a reduction in prices, holding other variables 
constant. Indeed, the results suggest that telecommunications and rail transport prices in the EU15 were 
more than 20% lower in 2001 than they would have been without the market opening that took place 
between 1993 and 2000. For electricity the equivalent figure is 8%, while only a modest price reduction is 
attributed to market opening in the gas industry (1%). For air transport, no statistically significant 
relationship was found and the results for urban passenger transport and postal services suggest that the 
reforms actually led to slight increases in prices. However, according to the authors of that study, the 
results for the two latter sectors can partly be attributed to poor data quality. 
A study carried out by the ECB
50 postulates that further regulatory reforms in network industries could 
have a significant downward influence on telecommunications, electricity and gas prices. In a first stage 
the authors estimate the effect of a set of regulatory variables on price levels faced by different customers 
(e.g. households and industrial customers). In a second stage they assume a scenario in which all EU15 
Member States align their regulatory conditions on those of the 'best practice' country. In the 
telecommunications sector prices would fall substantially (about 27-28%) for local and international calls, 
and only slightly for long distance calls and calls to mobile phones (0.05-0.2%). In the electricity and gas 
sectors, price falls calculated by this method would lie between 16% and 25% for households and between 
22% and 35% for industrial users. 
Furthermore there is evidence suggesting that European companies reacted to this decline 
in profit margins in terms of pricing but also by increasing their efficiency and reducing 
                                                 
46   See: Veugelers (2004).  
47   For more details see: Griffith et al. (2006). 
48   See: Allen et al. (1998). 
49   See: Market Opening in Network Industries, Copenhagen Economics, September 2005, 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/economic-reports/index_en.htm. 
50   See: Martin R., M. Roma, I. Vansteenkiste (2005). 
42their costs, which has allowed profit margins to be restored to some extent. A study
51 
showed that two phases can be distinguished in the evolution of price-cost margins in 
European manufacturing industry. Over the period 1989-1992, the fall in price-cost 
margins was mainly due to a decrease in prices greater than the decrease in costs while 
over the period 1992-1999, price-cost margins recovered mainly thanks to efficiency 
gains.  
These efficiency gains have been obtained through an increased presence on the markets 
of other Member States (increased multinationality) and a concentration of activities on 
the core businesses of companies (reduced sectoral diversification). Evidence shows that, 
between 1987 and 2000, firms in the Internal Market have expanded in size and 
increased their presence beyond national borders (see Figure 3-12), often via cross-
border mergers and acquisitions involving firms from different Member States and from 
outside the EU. Whereas in 1987, EU leading firms were on average active in three 
countries, this number increased to an average of five countries. Simultaneously EU 
firms concentrated their activities in their core business. The number of sectors in which 
leading firms were active declined from an average of 4.9 in 1987 to 3.3 in 2000. This 
increased sectoral concentration freed up funds for further investment in R&D and 
advertising
52. 
The sharper competition in the Internal Market can also contribute to the elimination or 
take-over of the least efficient firms, leaving fewer producers (bigger and more efficient) 
in the market. This should result in an increase in production concentration at the EU 
level. However, available studies suggest that while production concentration as a whole 
increased somewhat on average, there is wide diversity across industries with highly 
concentrated sectors in particular having witnessed a decline in concentration
53. 
                                                 
51   See: Sauner-Leroy (2003). 
52   See: Rondi et al. (2004) and Veugelers (2004). 
53   See: Veugelers (2004). 
43Figure 3-12:       Diversification, multinationality and firm size 
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3.1.3.2. Business dynamism 
Despite the observed changes in the competitive environment, rules and regulations in 
Europe appear to act as a constraint on the mobility of economic activity to more 
productive sectors and regions. In the retail sector, for example, restrictions emanating 
from spatial planning regulations work as an impediment to the introduction of new 
technologies and hinder organisational improvements (see section 4.4.2). More generally, 
the still relatively high levels of product market regulations in many EU Member States 
contribute to hinder business dynamism, preventing them from taking full advantage of 
the integrated EU market. Recent estimates show that administrative costs to the private 
sector represent 3.5% of GDP in the EU25.
54 However, this varies widely across 
Members States from 1.5% in the United Kingdom, Finland and Sweden to 6.8% of GDP 
in Greece for example.  
Regulatory requirements have their origin in local, national and EU level legislation. It 
would be fair to assume that in the absence of regulation at the EU level, there would 
exist, in most instances, a corresponding legislation at national level that would be 
equally, if not more burdensome. A situation in which 25 countries acted individually 
would most probably lead to higher administrative costs by creating huge inefficiencies. 
Also, one needs to bear in mind that market regulations help achieve valid policy goals, 
most notably in the area of consumer, health and environmental protection.  
Business dynamism, as measured by entry and exit, is essential for growth and progress 
has been made to facilitate business start-ups in Europe. However, in most EU countries, 
it is still more difficult to start a new business than in the US and according to the World 
Bank “Ease of Doing Business indicator”, most euro-euro countries underperformed 
relative to the US. Entry and exit rates continue to differ significantly between countries 
                                                 
54   See: Kox (2005). The estimated costs result directly from compliance to the requirements laid out in 
national and EU regulation, including time and effort of procedures such as filling in forms.  
44and industries. Recent figures show
55 that the average entry rate over the period 1997-
2003 was twice as large in the US than in most euro-area countries and the UK. The US-
EU gap in exit rates is even wider, reflecting the stigma associated with going bankrupt 
as well as the more onerous bankruptcy legislation in Europe. Entry rates in EU Member 
States were relatively high in sectors like post and telecommunications, electricity, gas 
and water supply and business activities and real estate, but lower in sectors like wood, 
textile and paper. Deregulation policies and the rapid pace of technological change in 
computer services can contribute to explain this discrepancy. A comparison of regulatory 
change in different domains show that the overall decline in the level of product market 
regulation in euro area countries over the period 1998-2003 is mostly due to a decline in 
state control (via a reduction in price controls and in direct government control over 
businesses) and to the elimination of barriers to trade and investment (via lower tariffs 
and fewer restrictions on foreign investment). Barriers to entrepreneurship have 
decreased less (see Box 3.3). 
Not only entry and exit per se but also the growth performance of enterprises in the years 
after entry is important. In this respect, a recent OECD study using firm level data 
reveals that while firms' turnover are similar in the Europe and the US, their post entry 
performance differs markedly
56. Firms in the US are smaller than EU firms when they 
enter the market but, if they survive, they grow much faster and reach higher average 
sizes in terms of employment. This is an indication of EU remaining barriers affecting 
firm growth, such as imperfect financial markets leading to lower financial 
possibilities
57, higher administrative costs at entry that affect the expansion of firms in 
their initial years and tight firing and hiring restrictions.  
 
Box 3.3:  EVOLUTION OF PRODUCT MARKET REGULATION 
The OECD product market regulation database
58 contains indicators on product market regulation for 19 
EU Member States
59. Objective information is collected using questionnaires completed by the countries 
themselves to construct sub-indices that are then aggregated up to using weights derived from principal 
component analysis. Product market regulations are grouped around three domains: state control, barriers 
to entrepreneurship and barriers to trade and investment.  
 
The World Bank 'Ease of Doing Business' indicator covers a wide range of market regulations, namely in 
terms of (i) starting a business; (ii) getting licences; (iii) hiring and firing workers; (iv) registering 
property; (v) getting credit; (vi) protecting investors; (vii) paying taxes; (viii) trading across borders; (ix) 
enforcing contracts; and (x) closing a business. The 2006 composite indicator showed that most euro-area 
Member States underperformed relative to the US. Within the EU, the front runner is the UK, while Italy 
and Greece are lagging well behind. Member States like Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands and 
especially Ireland and Finland have made good progress particularly in facilitating business operations. 
                                                 
55   See: Cincera  and Galgau (2005). 
56   See: Bartelsman et al. (2006). This study is based on firm level data for 1989 to 1994 for Canada, 
Denmark, Finland, Germany; France, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, United Kingdom, and US.  
57   The greater predominance of market-based financial systems in the US may lead to a lower risk 
aversion in project financing and to greater financing possibilities for entrepreneurs with small or 
innovative projects often characterised by limited cash flows and lack of collateral. 
58   See: Conway et al. (2005). 
59  Excludes Cyprus, Estonia, Malta, Latvia, Lithuania and Slovenia. 
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Figure 3-13:  Sources of change in EU18
60 product market regulation, 1998 to 2003 
1 Scope of public enterprise sector  9 Administrative burdens for sole proprietor firms 
2 Size of public enterprise sector  10 Sector specific administrative burdens 
3 Direct control over business enterprise 11 Legal barriers 
4 Use of command & control regulation  12 Antitrust exemptions 
5 Price controls 13 Ownership barriers 
6 Licence and permits system 14 Discriminatory procedures 
7 Communication and simplification of rules and procedures 15 Regulatory barriers 
8 Administrative burdens for corporation  16 Tariffs 
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Figure 3-14:  Ease of doing Business 2005-2006 
* EU25:  Simple average, excl. CY,LU,MT
Source:  World Bank, Doing Business in 2005/2006
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3.1.3.3. Price rigidities 
The results of recent surveys on price-setting behaviour also point to a lack of flexibility 
on product markets (see Box 3.4). They show that consumer prices are less flexible in the 
euro area than in the US and that in Europe price stickiness is particularly high in 
services. In particular, prices of services are less flexible downwards. While this 
                                                 
60    AT,BE,CZ,DE,DK,ES,FI,FR,GR,HU,IE,IT,LU,NL,PL,PT,SE,UK 
 
46downward price rigidity in services can be attributed to the higher labour intensity of the 
sector (and typically lower productivity growth), an insufficient degree of market 
integration (and competition pressure) due to the still low tradability of many service, the 
remaining regulatory distortions namely in network industries, retail trade, and 
professional services also play an important role
61. 
 
Box 3.4: THE PRICE SETTING BEHAVIOUR IN THE EURO AREA 
 
Recent surveys on euro-area price-setting behaviour, conducted by the Eurosystem of Central Banks, show 
that firms continue to have considerable market power. Prices change infrequently in the euro-area; on 
average, only 15% of consumer prices and 20% of producer prices change every month. While these 
patterns are similar to the US in relation to producer prices, for consumer prices the US is considerably 
more flexible (26% of prices change every month). Consumer prices change on average every two quarters 
in the US against four to five quarters in the euro area
62. In addition the frequency of price changes is more 
heterogeneous across sectors than across euro area countries. Prices change more frequently in sectors 
where demand, supply or input costs fluctuate more substantially, such as energy products (78% of 
consumer prices changing every month) and unprocessed foods (28%). Prices changes are the least 
frequent (6%) in services.  
 
Price decreases dominate all recorded price changes in the euro-area (around 40%), except in services. 
This confirms that in services barriers hampering competition and downward price flexibility persist
63. 
Since 1999 services average inflation (2.3 percent) has substantially exceeded non-energy industrial goods 
inflation (0.7 percent). While real convergence can partly explain some cross country differences in this 
regard policy reforms (e.g. healthcare reforms) and changes in administered prices still play an important 
role
64. In network industries, retail trade, and professional services, where regulatory distortions remain 
important downward price rigidities are the strongest.  
 
The most prominent factors preventing immediate price adjustments in the euro-area are implicit and 
explicit contracts with customers (that firms use to seek to make sales more predictable) and the still 
widespread use of "cost-based pricing" strategies that imply that prices are not changed unless costs 
change, and "competitors' prices" strategies when firms prefer not to change their price unless one of their 
competitors moves first. In fact, mark-up pricing remains the dominant price setting behaviour in the euro-
area (54%) and 30% of euro-area firms reveal that their prices are shaped according to those of their 
competitors. Moreover, it is observed that the lower the competition pressure, the more frequent is the 
mark-up pricing methods used by the firm in the market. Furthermore, price discrimination remains a 
common practice; around 80% of euro-area firms set prices on a case-by-case basis or depending on the 
quantity of product sold. 
The survey provides empirical evidence that price dynamics in the euro-area are determined by the 
intensity of competition pressure and barriers to market access and corroborates the claim that promoting 
competition pressure is important for price adjustment within the euro-area
65. Firms in highly competitive 
markets are more likely to react more strongly to price-reducing and price-increasing shocks. However, 
this effect is stronger in the case of price-decreasing factors, especially those resulting from the demand 
side. 
                                                 
61   See: European Commission (2006c).  
62  See:  Fabiani  et al. (2005) and European Central Bank (2005). 
63   See: European Commission (2006c). 
64  Amongst euro-area Member States, services inflation has been highest in fast growing or catching-up 
countries such as Ireland, Portugal, Spain and Greece, but it has also been well above average in Italy, 
Luxembourg and the Netherlands. 
65  For producer prices, the more competitive the environment, the more frequently prices change. For 
consumer prices, there is substantial evidence that the frequency of price changes depends on the outlet 
type and is higher in super/hyper markets than in traditional corner shops.  
473.1.4  International dimension  
While the Internal Market aims at increasing economic integration among EU Member 
States it is not meant to be inward looking. It is a necessary step towards a more 
successful integration of the EU economy in world markets.  
Hence the trade boosting effect of the Internal Market is not limited to the promotion of 
intra-EU trade. As further integration boosts the dynamism of the EU business 
environment and the competitiveness of EU businesses, trade flows with the rest of the 
world are expected to grow. Available data confirms the increasing openness of the EU 
economy as the share of extra-EU25 trade to GDP - despite the slowdown observed in 
the last years - has increased since the mid-nineties (see Figure 3-1). 
However, the EU integration process could lead to the substitution of imports from 
cheaper extra EU suppliers by suppliers in other Member States flows if barriers to extra-
EU trade were high. This has not been the case in the EU where the extra-EU exporters 
have also benefited from the suppression of intra EU trade barriers and from the 
application of the principle of mutual recognition. In manufacturing since 1988 and until 
2003 (latest available data) the share of extra EU suppliers in apparent consumption (AC) 
has gradually increased at the expense of domestic production (see Figure 3-15). 
However in services, the relative importance of imports (both from within the EU and 
from outside) remained relatively subdued confirming the claim that in these sectors the 
process of integration is still in the early stages (see Figure 3-16). 
Figure 3-15:  Shares in apparent goods consumption (AC) of domestic production, 
intra-EU imports and extra-EU imports during the period 1988-2003 
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48Figure  3-16:    Shares in apparent services consumption (AC) of domestic 
production, intra EU-imports and extra-EU imports during the 
period 1992-2003 (in %) 
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Overall, the enlargement process and the consolidation of the Internal Market have not 
crowded out trade relations with third countries. This point is crucial for the future of the 
EU economy given the rapid economic growth experienced by economies like the US 
and Asia and their growing importance in world markets. 
As the European Internal Market becomes more integrated and efficient, it is expected to 
become more attractive for foreign firms. Moreover as it increases competition pressures 
within the EU and improves the business environment, it should also help EU firms to 
expand their activities beyond EU borders to fully benefit from the opportunities of 
globalisation. However, the empirical evidence on these issues is mixed. 
While European integration seems to be associated with an increase of intra-EU FDI 
activity, the available evidence suggests that the Internal Market has not been able to 
deliver in terms of promoting further the role of the EU with respect to global investment 
flows. Two effects can play a role in explaining this evolution: either, the prospects of 
growth offered by the Internal Market are not any more sufficiently attractive for foreign 
investors, especially by comparison with fast growing economies like India and China, or 
the integration of the European markets has rendered unnecessary foreign presence in 
several Member States. Since 2001 the volume of FDI from the rest of the world into the 
EU25 has gradually declined (see Figure 3-17). The trend is only reversed in 2005. 
Between 2001 and 2002 the volume of FDI flows from the EU25 to the rest of the world 
dropped sharply. Thereafter it remained flat until 2005, when it recovered slightly. The 
Internal Market two-fold objective of making the EU a more attractive place for foreign 
investors and of boosting the presence and competitive position of EU firms in world 
markets seems far from being achieved. 
49Figure 3-17:   FDI flows between the EU25 and the rest of the world 
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Source: Eurostat 
 
The same picture emerges from M&A data which show that the share of the EU in the 
number of targeted firms in M&A operations has continuously decreased since the 
1990s. In 1991, almost 50% of M&A operations by non-EU firms targeted EU firms. In 
2005 this share had fallen to slightly above 30% (see Figure 3-18).  
Figure 3-18:   EU share of total number of worldwide acquisitions by non-EU firms 
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Source:  Own calculations based on Thomson Financial Services 
 
This geographical shift may first be explained by globalisation, which has allowed access 
to markets with higher growth potential and higher returns on investment. European 
firms themselves have increasingly acquired non-EU firms in all sectors. Second, this 
development mirror technology changes of recent years which have greatly expanded the 
possibilities for exploiting further the international division of labour. This has affected 
in particular the worldwide location of manufacturing, the sector where the reduction of 
50the EU share in terms of targeted firms was the largest over the period 1990- 2005 
(compared with other sectors). This reduction was particularly felt in the low-tech and 
medium low-tech segments
66. In contrast, in services, notably in business services, the 
share of the total number of targeted firms has clearly increased after 2000, breaking with 
the decreasing trend of the previous years. 
The evidence regarding EU firms as bidders in foreign markets also suggest subdued 
dynamism. Since 2000 EU firms have been less active in world markets relatively to 
firms from the rest of the world, particularly in the fast growing Asian service sectors
67. 
The difference vis-à-vis the US is striking; between 2000 and 2004 the number of 
acquisitions by US firms was twice that of EU firms. 
 
Figure 3-19:   EU and US M&A in Asia (1990-2004) 
 
Source:  Own calculations based on Thomson Financial Services 
 
3.1.5 International  specialisation 
Not only are EU firms less active in fast growing markets but also they have not 
managed to improve their performance in fast growing sectors at world level although 
this was one of the main goals of the 1992 Single Market Programme. By mid 1980s, the 
observation was made that the EU was insufficiently specialised in high-tech sectors and 
that in these sectors, the EU was loosing market share at world level. This situation has 
not changed dramatically since. 
The Internal Market and the EMU have been associated with trade boosting effects and 
the EU25 has managed to maintain its share of total word exports and imports (18.7% 
and 18.9% respectively in 2003) over the last decade despite the emergence of 
developing countries, namely China, as major trading partners. The accession of the 
                                                 
66   However, this reduction was observed in all segments of the EU15 manufacturing sector including the 
high-tech and medium-tech segments. This seems to indicate that EU firms have become less attractive 
in technology-driven segments. For more details see: Garnier (2006). 
67   The combined service sectors comprise wholesale trade; retail trade; and other services (which include 
hotels, personal services, business services, health services, legal services, etc.). 
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51Central and Eastern economies provided firms with the additional opportunities to 
reallocate factors within the Internal Market and implement EU wide production sharing 
strategies to boost their international competitiveness. The decomposition of trade 
according to the nature of the exchanged goods confirms that the EU new Members 
States have become net importers from the EU15 of intermediate goods and capital 
goods to become assembly platforms for manufacturing and net exporters of consumer 
goods.  
Nonetheless, while the overall evidence points to the conclusion that the Internal Market 
triggered efficiency seeking intra-EU reallocation of resources it has not led to a 
sufficient shift of the specialisation of the production sector towards the more technology 
intensive sectors where EU competitiveness can be more sustainable in the long-run. 
Recent evidence suggests that the structure of EU trade remains less than ideally suited 
to fully realise the potential gains from deeper international economic integration
68. 
The EU trade balance in high-tech sectors is improving but a significant part of EU trade 
is concentrated in intermediate skills sectors whereas other high-income regions, like the 
US and some Southeast Asian economies, are more specialised in products requiring 
high to high-intermediate skills. EU exports of medium-high and medium-low tech 
industries accounted for over 40% of world exports in the period 1998-2003 (see Table 
3-3). In contrast, in ICT-related industries, the EU accounted only for 11.4 % of world 
exports while the US and Japan accounted for considerably larger shares, 16.6% and 
12.8% respectively. 16.6% of world exports of low technology goods originated in the 
EU 25 while only 8.4% and 1.6% came from the US and Japan. Furthermore, contrary to 
Japan and the US, the EU25 reveals a comparative disadvantage in high technology 
sectors including ICT (see Table 3-3).
69 
Table 3-3:   World export market shares by skill intensity of sectors (in%) 
  
 High  Technology  ICT
70  Medium Technology  Low Technology 
 1998-2003  1998-2003  1998-2003  1998-2003 
EU15 (Extra)  13.1  10.4  37.2  14.0 
EU10 0.8 1.0  4.3  2.6 
US 19.9  16.6 23.8 8.4 
Japan 11.8  12.8  18.2  1.6 
China 2.8 3.0  4.5  7.4 
S.E. Asia (excl China)  22.8  26.8  19.1  17.4 
India 0.1  0.1  0.7  1.9 
Source: Commission services 
 
 
 
                                                 
68   For a more detailed analysis see: European Commission (2005a). 
69   See also: European Commission (2005). 
70   Part of the "High Technology" sectors.  
52Table 3-4:   Revealed  comparative  advantage according to skill intensity 
categories
71 
 
 Skill  Intensity 
  High 
Technology  ICT  Medium-High 
Technology 
Medium-Low 
Technology  Low Technology 
EU15 -26.1  -30.1  95.9  13.8  -13.1 
EU10 -19.0  -13.1  -20.1  23.3  44.0 
US 39.6  8.8 21.3 -6.9  -33.5 
Japan 56.7  53.8 159.9 12.7  -114.4 
China -18.0  -8.1  -94.9  -15.8  135.7 
Source: Commission services 
In those sectors where most of the growth in world exports is realised like 
semiconductors, passenger cars, telecommunications, computers, computer parts and 
pharmaceuticals) the EU was only able to keep its market position but not to improve it. 
Notably, in the more ICT-intensive industries like semiconductors, computers and parts 
and accessories for computers the export share of the EU is well below its overall share 
in the world's total exports. In services, in spite of the concerns about growing offshoring 
opportunities the EU remains a net exporter, particularly of other business eservices and 
financial services
72.  
This present specialisation pattern raises concerns as it leaves the EU economy greatly 
exposed to greater pressure from competition from emerging economies, namely China 
and India. These countries are upgrading the skill intensity of their exports and are 
rapidly catching up in terms of the non-price factors that often underlie the EU 
competitive edge in global markets particularly in upmarket products. Thus, stronger 
employment growth in the EU in services and high-tech manufacturing sectors – a move 
up the value chain – is desirable for sustaining and increasing EU living standards. The 
Internal Market has an important role to play. The noticeable lag of the EU with respect 
to ICT industries can be attributed to the lack of progress so far in the creation of a 
competitive Internal Market for services (which are the main consumers of ICT) and to a 
European innovation deficit.  
3.1.6 Innovation   
The Internal Market does not seem to have been a sufficient catalyst for innovation and 
resource reallocation towards technology intensive activities despite the observed 
reduction in mark-ups and evidence pointing to a reorganisation of production activities. 
Recent empirical findings show that the Single Market Programme (SMP) has 
contributed to a reduction in price-costs mark-ups, particularly in the manufacturing 
sectors that were most affected by the SMP. The increase in competition (as measured by 
the mark-ups) has helped to foster investments in R&D in manufacturing across the 
EU
73. While the effect of the Internal Market on R&D and innovation has been positive, 
it has not been strong enough to significantly improve the innovation and productivity 
growth performance of the EU. On a more positive note, these results show that a better 
                                                 
71   This indicator gives the contribution of different products or product groupings to the cyclically 
adjusted trade balance of the particular country or country grouping , see European Commission (2005) 
for more details on formulas used and calculations. A positive value means that the considered 
economy has a comparative advantage in the analysed sector. 
72   For a more detailed analysis see: European Commission (2005). 
73   See: Griffith R., R. Harrison R. and H. Simpson H. (2006). 
53functioning and more integrated Internal Market can make a valuable contribution to 
improve the innovation performance of the EU economy. In this respect, the experience 
of the US illustrates that a more competitive and integrated market is essential to better 
exploit the innovative potential of the European economy as it moves closer to the 
technology frontier. 
 
Figure 3-20:  Innovation index and R&D spending as % of GDP 
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Source: Commission services based on Eurostat data  
However, the innovative performance of the EU as a whole and of most EU countries 
lags significantly behind that of top performers such as the US and Japan (see Figure 
3-20). There are some clear exceptions, notably the Nordic economies, which outperform 
the US and Japan. 
Such intra-EU disparity is not a cause for concern per se, as in an integrated market the 
emergence of front-runners building on specific location of advantages is expected. What 
is more worrying is the widening gap between the laggards and front-runners and 
between the EU and other developed economies. This reflects the fact that the EU 
innovation environment remains weak in a number of key "input "indicators, such as the 
amount of public and private R&D and the stock of science and technology researchers, 
as well as weaknesses in the higher education system. In addition market conditions and 
knowledge networks are key areas of EU weakness. European companies are not 
sufficiently encouraged to innovate and, in this respect, the Internal Market has been an 
insufficient driver of innovation: some markets, in particular in services, remain too 
fragmented: a clearer and more efficient Intellectual Property Rights system is lacking; 
the potential of public procurement as innovation-driver is insufficiently exploited; and, 
the European Research area is still too much fragmented, leading to duplication and 
waste of resources (see also section 4.7)
74. All these elements contribute to the 
difficulties of the EU in developing ICT industries and to the EU's deteriorating 
attractiveness for international R&D investments compared to the US.  
                                                 
74  The Internal Market is also losing its attractiveness for international R&D investment. Multinational 
companies prefer to carry out their R&D activities in the US - and more recently in China and India -
rather than in the EU. The Asian share of overseas R&D expenditures by US-based companies is 
rising, while the European share is declining: US outward R&D investment in China has increased by 
25% per year since the mid-1990s against 8% per year in EU15, see: Garnier (2006).  
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Concluding this section on the micro economic effects of the Internal Market, the overall 
picture that emerges is that integration seems to have lost momentum over the recent 
yeas. It is quite natural to observe a slowing down over time in the process of European 
product market integration as remaining barriers are increasingly difficult to remove. 
Nevertheless, while much has already been achieved the potential for further progress 
does not appear to be completely exhausted: the US still is a more integrated trade area 
than the EU as the ratio of intra-US States exports to GDP remains around a third higher 
than the ratio of intra-EU15 exports to GDP. The scope for further trade integration and 
price convergence in services still remains important. Moreover, the EU continues to 
have comparative disadvantage in high tech sectors including ICT. This disappointing 
result confirms that despite the good trade performance of the EU over the last years the 
necessary specialisation shift towards higher technology intensive sectors has failed to 
occur. The EU has not yet managed to establish itself as an innovation driven technology 
leader which is crucial to successfully reap the fruits of the changing and increasingly 
integrated global economy. 
3.2.  Macroeconomic effects 
While there is evidence pointing to the conclusion that more can still be achieved in 
terms of promoting economic integration, efficiency and innovation, it is interesting to 
assess what has been the macroeconomic impact of the Internal Market Programme, 
particularly taking into account the more recent progress made in terms of liberalisation 
of network industries and the accession of 10 new Member States. Before presenting the 
results of the macroeconomic simulations a word of caution is necessary. The Internal 
Market is essentially a series of microeconomic reforms which together have a 
potentially significant macroeconomic impact. It is not straightforward however to derive 
the aggregate impact of a series of reforms which are spread out over time and affect 
sectors with quite different characteristics. The work presented below consists of three 
strands of analysis. First, macroeconomic impact of EU-15 market integration in 
manufacturing is estimated by simulating the competition and innovation effects as 
described in the already well-established literature on the impact of the Single Market 
Programme. Second, a more targeted simulation of the macroeconomic impact of the 
opening up to competition of the electricity and telecommunication markets has been 
carried out. Third, the competition and innovation effects of the increased trade in the 
enlarged EU of 25 Member States has been simulated. 
The Commission’s QUEST model has been used to carry out simulations ex-post of the 
macroeconomic impact of the Internal Market over the period 1992-2006. The 
simulations for the manufacturing industry are based on parameter estimates found in the 
empirical literature on the impact of the Singe Market Programme (SMP) on price-cost 
mark-ups and total factor productivity
75. The simulations presented in Tables 3-5 through 
3-7 assume that the SMP has resulted in a 0.9 percentage point decline in the aggregate 
price-cost mark-up and an increase in total factor productivity of 0.5%. 
                                                 
75   See: Allen et al. (1998), Buigues et al. (1990), Bottasso and Sembenelli (2001), Notaro (2002) and 
Salgado (2002). 
55For network industries, the reduction in aggregate price-cost mark-ups associated with 
the liberalisation of network industries (electricity and telecommunication) is assumed to 
be 0.5 percentage points. This parameter estimate is based on preliminary evidence for 
the electricity sector suggesting a decline in price-cost margins of up to 25%
76. A 
somewhat larger decline in price-cost margins in telecommunications is assumed in light 
of the faster pace of liberalisation in that sector
77. The 0.5% aggregate mark-up shock 
reflects these sectoral declines in price-cost margins plus the weight of the electricity and 
telecommunication sectors in GDP. The introduction of this shock in QUEST results in 
an increase in GDP and employment of 0.4% and 0.6% respectively after 4 years; GDP is 
estimated to increase by 0.6% after 10 years
78. 
These intra-EU15 simulations have been combined with simulations capturing the effects 
of EU enlargement. The enlargement simulations consist of three steps: (1) isolating the 
trade effect of the enlargement; (2) computing the resulting effect on mark-ups and total 
factor productivity; and finally (3) introducing the estimated mark-up and total factor 
productivity shocks into the QUEST model. The mark-up reductions over the period 
2002-2006 add up to 0.05 and 1.75 percentage points for the old and new Member States 
respectively, while the gains in total factor productivity build up to 0.15% and 1.15% in 
2006. According to the simulations, the magnitude of the enlargement effects varied 
substantially between the old and new Member States as the latter faced much higher 
mark-up and total factor productivity shocks during the early years of the enlargement. 
For the EU15 the simulations showed a 0.27% GDP increase in 2006
79 (relative to the 
baseline level) as a result of enlargement. This was accompanied by a slight increase in 
employment (see Table 3-5 and Table 3-6). In contrast the simulations for the new 
Member States showed a GDP increase of 2.9% on average, while employment increased 
by 0.5% in 2006 (relative to the baseline). 
To compute the combined effect of EU15 integration and the enlargement, the 
corresponding yearly mark-up and total factor productivity shocks have been added up.  
Table 3-7 presents the results for the EU25. These results show that the enlarged Internal 
Market (including liberalisation of network industries) is an important source of growth 
and jobs. As a result of the progress made over the period 1992-2006 in achieving an 
enlarged Internal Market of 25 Member States, GDP and employment levels have 
increased significantly. The estimated "gains" from the Internal Market in 2006 amount 
to 2.2% of EU GDP (or 223 billion euro) 
80 and 1.4% of total employment (or 2.75 
million jobs). These gains could have been substantially larger if services market had 
been fully opened up to cross-border competition (see section 4.4). 
                                                 
76   See: Roeger and Warzynski (2002). 
77    The (cautious) assumption has been made that mark-ups in the telecommunications sector have 
decreased by 50% more than in electricity. This assumption is also consistent with the more advanced 
state of liberalisation in telecommunications.  
These effects are somewhat stronger than the Internal Market effects, because in these simulations it is   
assumed that deregulation also has an effect on rent sharing between workers and firms. The decline 
in price-cost mark-ups is therefore associated with a decline in the mark-up of wages over the 
reservation wage. 
79     The enlargement trade effect is identifiable already in the years before enlargement took place in 
2004. 
80   In 2002 prices. 
56Table  3-5:    GDP effects of the Internal Market (SMP), the liberalisation of 
network industries and enlargement (deviation from baseline level), 
2002-2006 
EU15  EU10 
Network+SMP
a  Enlargement Network+SMP+Enlargement Enlargement
b  Years 
mrd EUR  %  mrd EUR  %
  mrd EUR  %  mrd EUR  % 
2002  164,5 1,79%  15,9 0,17%  180,4  1,96%  8,8  1,96% 
2003  168,4 1,81%  18,9 0,20%  187,3  2,01%  11,4  2,45% 
2004  172,2 1,81%  21,2 0,22%  193,4  2,03%  12,8  2,62% 
2005  176,1 1,83%  24,5 0,25%  200,6  2,08%  14,8  2,90% 
2006  179,9 1,83%  27,1 0,27%  207,0  2,10%  15,6  2,91% 
Table 3-6:   Employment effects of the Internal Market (SMP), the liberalisation 
of network industries and enlargement (deviation from baseline 
level), 2002-2006 
EU15  EU10 
Network+SMP
a  Enlargement Network+SMP+Enlargement Enlargement
b  Years 
1000 p.  %  1000 p.  %  1000 p.  %  1000 p.  % 
2002  2450,6  1,47%  67,9 0,04% 2518,5  1,51%  118,9 0,41% 
2003  2454,5  1,46%  85,4 0,05% 2539,9  1,51%  104,2 0,36% 
2004  2458,3  1,45%  86,0 0,05% 2544,3  1,50%  116,5 0,40% 
2005  2462,2  1,44% 104,1  0,06% 2566,3  1,50%  145,0 0,49% 
2006  2466,0  1,43% 122,4  0,07% 2588,4  1,50%  162,1 0,54% 
Table 3-7:   Total GDP and employment effects of the Internal Market (SMP), the 
liberalisation of network industries and enlargement (deviation from 
baseline level), 2002-2006 
EU25 
Total GDP effect  Total employment effect  Years 
mrd EUR  %  1000 p.  % 
2002  189,2 1,96%  2637,4  1,35% 
2003  198,7 2,05%  2644,1  1,34% 
2004  206,2 2,08%  2660,8  1,34% 
2005  215,4 2,15%  2711,2  1,35% 
2006  222,6 2,18%  2750,5  1,36% 
Sources: 
*  EU15 Internal Market and network liberalization effect: W. Röger and K. Sekkat (2002), 'Request from DG 
MARKT to Assess the Macroeconomic Effects of the Single Market Program after 10 years.' 
** Effect of enlargement on EU15 and EU10: J. Varga (2006): 'Ex-post Simulation of the Early Enlargement 
Process with QUEST II.' The impact of enlargement is based on manufacturing data only, see p. 8. "Table 1: Ex-
post enlargement effects (deviation from baseline-level), EU12-EU15" 
GDP: AMECO, Gross domestic product at constant prices in mrd EUR in 2002 prices. 
EMPLOYMENT: Employment, 1000 persons; total economy (National accounts) 
Note: The EU15 network + SMP effect (column A) is calculated by linear interpolation from the results of Roeger and 
Sekkat (2002). 
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4.  WHY HAS THE POTENTIAL OF THE INTERNAL  MARKET NOT BEEN FULLY 
EXPLOITED? 
The creation of the Internal Market based on the Single Market Programme and 
successive legislative programmes is a necessary, but not a sufficient condition for 
European companies to successfully face the challenges of globalisation. This chapter 
considers various factors preventing the full exploitation of the potential of the Internal 
Market. Section 4.1 considers problems of insufficient implementation and application of 
existing legislation and instruments by the Member States. Section 4.2 recounts the 
difficulties of agreeing on common product standards and of applying the mutual 
recognition principle. Section 4.3 discusses the failure to fully open up public 
procurement markets. Section 4.4 treats barriers preventing the free provision of services 
across borders, while section 4.5 focuses on fiscal barriers. Section 4.6 looks at barriers 
hindering the free movement of people and the final section 4.7 investigates barriers to 
the diffusion of knowledge and innovation. 
The results of simulations quantifying the potential effects of the removal of some 
remaining barriers show that the macroeconomic gains resulting from the Internal Market 
(2.1% of GDP in 2006, as indicated in section 3.2) could have been substantially larger if 
services markets had been fully opened up to cross border competition and fiscal barriers 
reduced. The implementation of the Services Directive could stimulate trade and foreign 
direct investment in services, resulting in a further 0.5 to 1% increase in GDP (see box 
4.1). Fully integrated financial markets could – in the medium to long term - lower the 
cost of capital for EU companies by about 0.5 percentage points, and this could bring 
about a rise in the level of GDP of 1.1% in the long run (see box 4.3). The further 
opening up of energy would lead to an increase in GDP by about 0.6-0.8 % (see box 4.5).  
Finally, the potential gains from increased tax cooperation could represent 0.2% of GDP 
(see box 4.6) 
4.1.  Slow transposition and incorrect application of Internal Market Directives 
The adoption and implementation of Internal Market Directives is the main policy tool 
specifically targeted at creating a better functioning Internal Market. Over the period 
1999-2006 a number of important Directives with a direct effect on the EU economy 
have been proposed by the Commission, agreed with Council and Parliament, and started 
to be implemented by the Member States. Prominent examples are the legal framework 
for electronic commerce; modernising legislation in public procurement; consolidation 
and modernisation of rules regulating the recognition of professional qualifications; and, 
the recent political agreement within the Council on a draft services directive. However, 
all these new Directives need to be efficiently implemented by the Member States in 
order to be effective.  
Member States have the primary responsibility for transposing Community directives 
into domestic legislation and for ensuring a correct implementation. However, there are 
important differences between Member States in terms of speed and efficiency of 
transposition. Two times a year the Commission publishes an Internal Market 
Scoreboard, which reports on progress made by the Member States in bringing down 
their transposition deficit. According to the latest 2006 Scoreboard
81, the global 
                                                 
81   See: European Commission (2006d).  
58transposition deficit for Internal Market directives finally achieved the 1.5% target 
originally set by the Member States for the Spring of 2002.  
In the view of the prominent role of the Internal Market as an adjustment mechanism in 
the euro area, the improved performance of many euro area Member States in 
transposing and applying Internal Market legislation is a positive sign. Nevertheless, it is 
a cause for concern that in four euro area countries (Greece, Luxemburg, Italy and 
Portugal) the transposition deficit remains well above the 1.5% target. In addition, the 
large number of infringements of Internal Market legislation illustrates that frequently 
Internal Market rules are disregarded or incorrectly applied.  
The adoption and transposition into domestic law of EU Directives is a necessary but 
insufficient condition for the well-functioning of the Internal Market. Although the SMP 
and successive Internal Market strategies have been aimed at creating a level playing 
field by providing a set of rules to be applied across the Community territory, some 
provisions have lacked clarity and precision. The result is divergent, occasionally even 
conflicting interpretations by different Member States, which often result in the 
distortion of competition. Problems resulting from an uneven application and weak 
enforcement of EU regulation have been highlighted by many respondents of a recent 
public consultation carried out by the Commission on the future Single Market policy
82. 
Concrete examples came for example from the music and high-tech industry, pointing at 
the incorrect implementation of the e-commerce and copyright directive or the food and 
beverages industry criticising Member States' compliance with the Packaging Directive. 
The often incorrect application of Internal Market rules can also be illustrated by the high 
number of infringement cases that the Commission has had to launch. According to the 
latest Internal Market Scoreboard none of the Member States has kept its promise to 
reduce infringement proceedings by 50% in 3 years.  
 
 
4.2.  Inadequate standards and insufficient mutual recognition 
4.2.1. Product standards 
The adoption of agreed standards and the application of the mutual recognition principle 
are two main tools for bringing down technical barriers to trade between Member States. 
The economic benefits of standards for producers are compatibility and interoperability 
of the traded products, reducing trade costs and allowing a better exploitation of 
economies of scale. For consumers, standards reduce uncertainty and costs of purchase 
decisions by facilitating comparisons. They can, furthermore, take into account broader 
policy objectives regarding consumer welfare, environmental protection, etc. Finally, 
standards may be viewed as a tool to promote the dissemination of know-how.  
Nevertheless, there are some important outstanding issues: (i) industry is insufficiently 
aware of the strategic advantages of standardisation, which is often still seen as a cost 
factor; (ii) there is still room for improving the efficiency of the standards development 
process; and (iii) the speed of transposition of European standards into national standards 
is rather slow. Alternatives to the present, partly diversified system based on many 
competing National Standards Bodies may have to be considered. Moreover, the 
Commission has identified
83 a number of new challenges that European standardisation 
                                                 
82   See: European Commission (2006e).  
83   See: European Commission (2006f). 
59system is facing against the background of EU enlargement, the increased use of ICT and 
globalisation: 
–  Enlargement: European legislation and policies supported by standards can only 
work properly when they are complemented by a sound and well functioning 
European standards system including all of the Member States’ National Standards 
Bodies. Due to the structure and size of enterprises in the new Member States, the 
involvement of Small and Medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in standardisation work 
and the use of European standards present a particular problem in the sense that 
access to standards must be improved.  
–  ICT: The rapid development of technologies and processes in some sectors, in 
particular in the information and communication technology (ICT) sector, has led to 
an industry need for the equally rapid creation of specifications which do not have 
the status of a formal standard. In order to respond to this need, there has been a 
mushrooming of industrial fora and consortia developing such specifications. While 
the increased flexibility of this approach is welcome, one should avoid that it leads 
to the development of multiple specifications lacking interoperability. 
–  Globalisation: At the time of the establishment of the Single Market, there were 
some fears that the Internal Market would become a “Fortress Europe” by throwing 
up protectionist barriers (in the form of rather restrictive product standards, e.g.) and 
trading only with itself. In fact, as the evidence presented in the previous chapter 
showed, the opposite has happened. Over the past ten years, extra-EU imports into 
the EU have grown steadily. This is a clear sign that EU-wide product standards 
have contributed to the creation of a large homogeneous market, which has 
facilitated market access for firms from third countries. With increased globalisation 
and world trade, however, the question of standards has gone beyond that of the 
removal of trade barriers within the EU: an increased recourse to common standards 
within and outside the EU would open wider export possibilities. Accordingly, the 
Commission is supporting activities at international level which recommend the use 
of voluntary international standards. Based on international agreements, around 40% 
of all European standards are already direct transpositions of international ones and 
this percentage is increasing steadily. In particular, in the electro-technical field, the 
majority of European standards, around 75%, are either identical to IEC
84 standards 
(70%) or based on them (5%). 
4.2.2. New Approach  
The "New Approach" restricts product legislation to only those essential requirements 
necessary to make products safe. It was developed as a tool to offer a more flexible and 
simple approach towards standardisation. It foresees the adoption of less stringent forms 
of legislation in areas where, otherwise, any detail would have to be determined by the 
legislative act itself. The technical transposition of common principles is left to the 
producers. New Approach Directives are special in that they do not contain technical 
detail but broad safety and other basic requirements that have to be translated by 
manufacturers into technical solutions. With the New Approach standards can be updated 
much faster than via legislation. In particular technological developments can be more 
                                                 
84   International Electrotechnical Commission. 
60easily incorporated into regulatory requirements, thereby encouraging the diffusion of 
new technologies.  
Together, the trading volume of products covered by the new approach is estimated to 
exceed €1500 billion per year. While in this sense the New Approach has proved to be 
very successful, experience of implementation and identification of shortcomings have 
called for revisions of the principle in order to enhance its effectiveness, e.g. in the fields 
of market surveillance (enforcement of legislation at national level) and to ensure 
coherence of rules for the operation of Notified Bodies for conformity assessment. The 
New Approach is seen to be very dependent on the efficiency of the European standards 
bodies. It also suffers from the “industry” image of standardisation activities, making it 
often less attractive for the protection of the environment, protection of the consumer or 
of the worker at the work place. In June 2006 the Commission launched a public 
consultation
85 seeking the views from all interested parties on improving the New 
Approach, in particular in the areas of conformity assessment, CE marking and market 
surveillance. A legislative proposal addressing above mentioned problems is planned for 
the end of 2006 and it should put into place complementary tools for a better and more 
effective operation of existing and future legislation.  
4.2.3. Mutual recognition 
While the New Approach to standardisation is increasingly popular, in areas where no 
common standards have been agreed the principle of mutual recognition continues to 
apply. This principle allows goods that have been legally manufactured and/or sold in 
one country to be sold elsewhere without further formalities
86. Mutual recognition has 
been one of the main Community instruments for eliminating regulatory non-fiscal 
barriers to the free movement of goods within the EU. About 20% of industrial 
production and about 26% of intra-EU manufacturing trade are covered by mutual 
recognition
87. However, the practical implementation of the mutual recognition principle 
is often hampered by legal uncertainty, administrative hassle and a lack of awareness 
both from the side of the companies and that of the Member States` authorities. 
The costs for enterprises of product conformity assessment can be substantial. Estimates 
vary depending on the type of product, its technical specifications, the size of the market 
of the receiving Member State, the size of the enterprise, etc. For companies offering 
several product types on a national market of a receiving Member State, these costs have 
been estimated to amount to approximately 2% of their entire annual turnover on that 
market. These costs are relatively higher for companies specialised in one specific 
product type because they do not benefit from economies of scale and learning in 
complying with these regulations. For these companies, the compliance and redundancy 
costs are reported to amount to approximately 10% to 15% of their entire annual turnover 
on a larger foreign market. These percentages increase fast for smaller national markets. 
In 2003, the Commission published a Communication clarifying this principle and 
aiming to help businesses and national administrations make it work better.  
Nevertheless, problems with the practical application of the mutual recognition principle 
remain. It is estimated that around one quarter of enterprises relying on mutual 
                                                 
85   For more information, see: http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/newapproach/review_en.htm 
86  Under the mutual recognition principle, Member States cannot forbid the sale of such goods except for 
justified cause as described in Article 30 of the EC Treaty or on the basis of overriding requirements of  
general public importance recognised by the Court of Justice’s case law. 
87   See inter alia: European Commission (2001b and 2001c).
 
61recognition when selling goods in another Member State have problems
88. As a result, 
many companies have come to the conclusion that it is less costly to adapt their products 
to the regulations in place in the country of destination rather than to rely on the 
application of the mutual recognition principle. 
An impact assessment
89 is being carried out by Commission services examining policy 
options to improve the functioning of the mutual recognition principle. Based on 
preliminary results the adoption of a legislative instrument, clarifying the burden of proof 
and reducing the regulatory risk in the receiving Member State, would help to improve 
the application of the mutual recognition principle. This legislative measure would have 
to be accompanied by non-legislative actions (such as improved administrative 
cooperation and the better provision of information on mutual recognition via a common 
website) addressing the lack of awareness of enterprises and national authorities about 
the existence of the mutual recognition principle  
4.3.  Public procurement 
Public procurement accounts for around 16% of EU GDP. Therefore, improvements in 
public procurement practices have the potential to generate significant economic 
benefits. While the opening up of public procurement within the Internal Market has 
increased cross-border competition, direct cross-border procurement remains very low, 
accounting for only 3% of the total number of bids. However, the rate of indirect public 
procurement made by foreign firms' local subsidiaries is significantly higher (30%)
90. 
Not all public procurement is subject to the obligations established by EU directives. 
Some activities, notably in the defence sector are subject to special rules. Overall, only 
about 22% of public procurement is published and thus open to competition.  
 
                                                 
88   See: European Commission (2004b). 
89   European Commission, Options to eliminate technical obstacles in the non-harmonised field of goods: 
impact assessment, forthcoming.
 
90   See: European Commission (2004c).  
62Figure 4-1:  Value of public procurement which is openly advertised as a % of total 
public procurement (EU15) 
 
While defence procurement expenditure accounts for 0.8% of GDP (including spending 
on equipment, which is equivalent to 0.3% of GDP), these markets are not open to 
competition because of the specific characteristics that distinguish defence procurement 
from other procurement. Defence products are often very sensitive and connected with 
sovereignty and national security; the programmes tend to be complex, have a long 
lifetime, and involve high development costs and major commercial risks. The exclusion 
of the defence sector from EU-wide public procurement rules has some negative 
consequences: (i) the lack of effectiveness of acquisition systems and procedures 
increases the costs of military equipment; (ii) even though a small number of Member 
States (DE, ES, FR, IT, SE, UK) is responsible for 90% of EU spending on defence 
equipment, the competitiveness of the European defence industry is affected by the 
relatively small size of the national markets; (iii) the dispersion of product development 
in the defence sector acts as an obstacle to knowledge diffusion in the high-tech sector 
more generally. These difficulties contrast with the experience of the US, where defence-
related government (R&D) spending has played a crucial role in the development of 
internationally competitive general-purpose technologies. This is especially true for a 
number of high-tech industries such as aircraft, nuclear power, computer, semiconductor, 
Internet and satellite communication, and Earth-observing systems developed in the 
US
91. 
Protecting large areas of economic activity from competition involves significant costs. 
The additional costs arising from sheltering sectors from cross-border competition have 
to be financed by the Member States' governments. The efficiency gains from a further 
opening up of the public procurement markets could, thus, result in important savings for 
the national budgets.  
                                                 
91   See: Ruttan (2006). 
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634.4.  Barriers remaining in services sectors  
4.4.1. Services in general 
Trade and cross-border activity in services remains relatively limited. While the share of 
services in EU-15 value added is close to 70%, services account for only one-fifth of 
intra-EU trade. Cross border transactions in services between two countries takes place 
mainly through (i) the international trade of services, such as road freight transport, 
telecommunications or consultancy and financial services; (ii) the establishment of 
production units in another country (for example banking or accountancy services); and 
(iii) the consumption of foreign non-traded services, such as tourism. Due to the rapid 
development and increased use of information and communication technologies, services 
have become increasingly tradable and exposed to international competition. 
Due to their specific nature and intangibility services are affected by more complex 
regulatory barriers than trade. Unlike goods, they often require business processes and 
the presence of the provider in both the country of origin of the service provider and in 
the country where the service is being delivered. This double presence can result in the 
duplication of regulatory requirements and burdens (national social security schemes for 
the staff, different administrative and tax procedures, etc.). In addition, foreign firms 
often face additional costs due to the non-acknowledgement of their compliance with 
their home country regulations
92. In this respect, there is often a lack of clarity on the 
regulations and their effective implementation, resulting in legal and economic 
uncertainty for foreign service providers. This regulatory heterogeneity severely restricts 
the realisation of economies of scale in complying with regulations within the EU. As 
already mentioned in chapter 3, another undesired effect of Internal Market barriers in 
the services sector are downwards price rigidities and the persistence of higher than 
average headline inflation in the services sector. 
In order to address and eliminate regulative distortions, the Commission approved in 
2004 a draft Services Directive. It intended the simplification of administrative rules, the 
identification of typical restrictions in the regulation of services, and (with exemptions) a 
shift from the prevailing system of mutual recognition to general application of the 
country-of-origin principle. The latter would allow service providers of residents of other 
Member States direct access to all national markets of the EU without any scrutiny by 
national authorities. The responsibility of supervising the service providers would remain 
with the Member State of origin. The amended Commission proposal of the Services 
Directive of early April 2006, took to a large extent on board amendments voted by the 
European Parliament. It is narrowing the original proposal through: (a) restrictions on the 
use of the country-of-origin principle; (b) the deletion of a provision outlawing 
anticompetitive practices; and (c) a narrowing of the scope of the Directive through the 
exclusion of sectors such as gambling, audiovisual services, health care and notaries.  
                                                 
92   Companies might have to provide professional (re-) qualifications, meet economic tests, and sometimes 
need to have the residence or even nationality of the owner or manager of the firm in the member state 
where the service is delivered, or for some branches geographical or quantitative limitations of 
establishment still exist. 
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Box 4.1: QUANTIFYING THE  MACROECONOMIC  IMPACT OF THE LIBERALISATION OF  SERVICES 
The available studies show that the implementation of the European Services Directive will generate more 
intra-EU trade, more foreign investment in services sectors and lower prices of services. GDP could go up 
by 0.5% to around 1% on average in Europe:  
Copenhagen Economics
93 quantified the impact of the Services Directive as it was when first submitted by 
the Commission to European Parliament. The results found pointed to an increase in aggregate 
employment of 0.3% (in the services industries employment would increase by 0.5%) and 1.1% in value 
added. Copenhagen Economics also considered the effect of the exclusion of the country of origin 
principle (CoOP) from the service directive in a study commissioned by the UK Department of Trade and 
Industry
94. The study found that the provisions relating to the CoOP account for around 10% of the total 
welfare gains (€2-4 billion per annum) from the service directive. This figure should however be viewed as 
the lower bound of the potential impact of withdrawing the CoOP. 
Kox ang Lejour (2006), find a similar result. They estimate that the trade and FDI effects of the EU 
services market liberalisation could lead to an increase in GDP by 0.5 to 1.5%.  The CoOP would account 
for about one-third of these effects. However, these estimates do not take into account the dynamic effects 
of this liberalisation. Improved market access could stimulate competitive selection and productivity 
growth. In addition, through trade and investment, knowledge spillovers could increase and innovation 
could be fostered.  These dynamic effects are harder to estimate. Back on the envelope calculations based 
on the relation between trade openness and growth suggest a further GDP increase by 2 to 5 % if the 
analysis incorporates these dynamic effects. 
 
Some services sectors, such as the network industries, retail trade, and professional 
services, suffer particularly from regulatory distortions, downward price rigidities and 
insufficient competition. The following sections take a closer look at developments in 
some of these sectors. 
4.4.2. Retail trade 
The lack of a truly integrated European market in retail trade and the prevalence of 
national and local restrictions on the freedom of establishment have contributed to the 
relatively (in comparison with the US) slow diffusion of new technologies and 
organisational improvements in European retail services. This has limited productivity 
growth in the sector (see Box 4.2) and has contributed to a greater price stickiness 
overall. While retail prices are sticky on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean, price changes 
in Europe are less frequent than those in the US. According to a recent study
95, there are 
two main assumed reasons for this difference: firstly the higher ICT intensity of this 
sector, the larger share of modern superstores and the greater diffusion of e-commerce in 
the US resulted into a greater automation of retail transactions and therefore into in lower 
menu costs. Secondly, in the US the competitive pressure of Wal-Mart and other large 
retailers encouraged other stores to adopt its technological and organisational best. 
Problems with the cross-border transactions of retail markets have also been highlighted 
by many respondents of the recent public consultation on the future of the Internal 
Market.  
                                                 
93   Copenhagen Economics (2005b) 
94   See Copenhagen Economics (2005c).  
95   See: Dhyne et al. (2006). 
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Box 4.2: LAGGING EU RETAIL AND WHOLESALE PRODUCTIVITY COMPARED TO THE US 
Wholesale and retail trade account for over 50% of the economy-wide productivity growth in the US after 
1995. These two sectors have experienced a significant acceleration in productivity growth around the 
mid-1990s, almost doubling the trend growth rate of the previous twenty years. The average contribution 
of wholesale (retail) trade to total productivity growth was 27% (26%) in the US compared with 10% (7%) 
in the EU between 1994 and 2003. A recent study
96 compared the US and EU retail and wholesale sectors 
productivity effectiveness. It explains why Europe is lagging behind the US by two main factors:  
(1)   The early start of the US in using ICT: over the last thirty years, the US retailing trade was 
transformed from a low-technology sector to one of the most intense users of ICT. The 
technologies used in this sector reward scale and scope, enabling large centralised chains and “big 
box” stores to expand rapidly. Europe has not changed as rapidly. In addition, unlike in the US, it 
has a heavy regulatory environment.  
(2)   Remaining regulatory obstacles within and between individual EU countries. While 
progressing, the process of deregulation and harmonisation between Member States has been 
much slower than in the US, leading to the expansion of retailers across Europe. For example 
there is by now a strong presence of Western European companies in the markets of the ten new 
Member States. However, there are still significant barriers within Member States. The three 
major categories of regulation affecting productivity growth within EU Member States are store 
opening hours, land usage restrictions (especially on large stores), and labour laws. Store 
opening-hour regulation has become critically important for the retail sector as lifestyles and 
working patterns have changed over the past 25 years. Similarly, a retailer’s survival is dependent 
on getting a convenient, visible location. There are two major channels by which land usage 
impacts productivity. Firstly, the limitation of entry and exit: restrictions on retail land usage cut 
back on both the creation of new stores and the elimination of old ones. Building new stores 
might become very expensive (resulting in fewer entrants) and artificially inflates the value of old 
stores based on the land they occupy. Secondly, land rule regulations usually hamper the 
establishment of large stores, reducing the ability to exploit economies of scale.  
4.4.3. Financial services  
Financial services account for about 6% of the EU's GDP. Financial development can 
contribute to economic growth and welfare via several channels, notably lower 
transaction costs, wider opportunities for risk sharing and, thus, more efficient resource 
allocation. To the extent that the financial sector is constrained in the performance of 
these various functions, there is a consequent cost in terms of sub-optimal economic 
performance and welfare loss.  
 
Box 4.3: QUANTIFYING THE ECONOMIC BENEFITS OF EU FINANCIAL INTEGRATION 
While the link between financial integration, financial development and economic performance is 
complex, two independent studies undertaken on behalf of the Commission services have attempted to 
quantify the benefits of EU financial integration in terms of GDP. 
A study by London Economics
97 (LE) adopts a macroeconomic approach to quantifying the economic 
effect of financial integration in the EU. The study focuses on the benefits of integrating the set of 
fragmented national systems into a pan-EU system by estimating the static efficiency gains from deeper 
and more liquid equity and bond markets. These gains are supplemented by improvements in the 
functioning of market infrastructure and greater competition between sources of direct and indirect 
financing. The study concludes that fully integrated markets could – in the medium to long term - lower 
                                                 
96   See: McGuckin et al. (2005).
 
97   London Economics (2002). 
66the cost of capital for EU companies by about 0.5 percentage points, and that this could bring about (i) a 
rise in the level of GDP of 1.1% in the long run; (ii) a 6% increase in the level of investment; (iii) a 0.8% 
increase in the level of private consumption; and (iv) a rise of 0.5% in the level of employment. The 
authors suggest that introducing dynamic adjustments would greatly increase the output and employment 
gains. The study also presents the results of a survey of market participants, which is used to confirm the 
assumptions underlying the empirical analysis. 
The second study by a group of CEPR
98 researchers adopts a more microeconomic approach and focuses 
on the relationship between financial-market integration and corporate growth. A three-stage approach is 
used. First, the authors screen the available measures of financial development – related for instance to 
efficiency or the size of the financial system. Second, they examine the impact of financial integration on 
financial development, which is expected to be positive, both quantitatively (larger market and access to 
foreign markets and lenders) and qualitatively (importing better institutions, e.g. relating to creditor rights 
and investor protection). Third, an econometric analysis, at both industry sector and firm level, provides 
estimates of the output growth effects of greater financial development due to integration. In a scenario in 
which EU manufacturing companies would have the same access to finance as US companies, value-added 
growth in EU manufacturing is estimated to increase by 0.75–0.94 percent on a durable basis. 
Quantifying the costs and benefits of financial integration is subject to significant data, statistical and 
model uncertainty. Accordingly, the results of these two studies can be considered only as indicative of the 
potential benefits of EU financial integration. In addition, exploiting these benefits fully will require 
flanking policies in the fields of competition, market transparency/integrity and financial stability. 
Nevertheless, the results of the studies tend to validate the rationale underlying EU policy on financial 
integration. 
EMU and the introduction of the euro have provided a major impetus to financial 
integration in the EU, by creating the potential for large and liquid financial markets and 
scale and scope economies among financial intermediaries. By eliminating currency risk 
within the euro area, the euro has stimulated demand for cross-border financial services 
more generally in the EU and has brought into sharper focus the opportunity costs of 
remaining sources of fragmentation in the financial system, notably in the field of market 
regulation. The costs and risks associated with cross-border financial transactions are 
unnecessarily high, thereby discouraging the conduct of financial activity on a pan-EU 
basis. The result is an inefficient allocation of economic resources due to unexploited 
scale/scope economies, sub-optimal risk management, inefficient pricing and reduced 
opportunities for investment/consumption smoothing.  
The process of EU financial integration is well underway in a range of areas and 
particularly in wholesale markets. However, as indicated below, progress has varied 
across the different sectors of the financial system, with unsecured segments (where there 
is no transfer of collateral involved) very much in the lead.  
The euro-area derivatives market is highly integrated with a sharp expansion of euro 
interest swap activity and the rise of pan-European equity based index trading. As 
regards the integration of money markets, the market for interbank deposits is fully 
integrated, as witnessed by the acceptance of market participants of EONIA (Euro 
Overnight Index Average) and EURIBOR (Euro Inter-Bank Offered Rate) as uniform 
price references. On the other hand, various obstacles (i.e. technical, regulatory, fiscal 
and legal) related to the clearing and settlement are holding back the integration of the 
secured market segments, (e.g. commercial paper and treasury bills) which involve the 
exchange of liquidity against collateral.   
In bond markets, the launch of the euro created a much more homogenous EU market, 
with largely convergent prices among euro-area member states and evidence of cross-
                                                 
98   See Giannetti M., L.Guiso, T. Jappelli, M. Padula and M. Pagano (2002). 
67border portfolio diversification. A deeper and more liquid euro-denominated bond 
market has resulted in higher net and gross issuance volumes for the market as a whole, 
when compared to the combined issuance in the legacy currencies.  
In equity trading, the impact of the euro has so far been strongest at the level of the 
investor, with an overall reduction in “home bias” and a re-orientation of asset managers’ 
investment strategies towards a European-based approach. In consequence, a number of 
studies have found increased correlation among the performance of national stock 
markets. In contrast, with cross-border listings still exceptional, there is little evidence of 
a euro impact on the behaviour of issuers. Integration in the equity market is also 
particularly impeded by inefficiencies in the clearing and settlement process.  
There has been a significant amount of M&As in the banking sector – still the dominant 
sector in providing euro area financing - although consolidation has mainly occurred 
along national lines due to a number of still existing legal and political barriers. The lack 
of cross-border banking integration is also reflected in the dispersion of national retail 
interest rates (for example for consumer credits or mortgages). A recent study by the 
ECB
99 explains such dispersion by structural differences among Member States in the 
retail banking sector, including different consumer protection rules, differing tax 
treatments of income from deposits as well as structural factors such as levels of 
technology and the degree of integration and competition in the financial sector. Three 
initiatives of the Commission are underway to address these differences: (a) a white 
paper on mortgage credit based on extensive consultations with stakeholders to be 
published in 2007, (b) a modified consumer credit directive, and (c) a proposal on 
payment services directive to enhance the competition and to facilitate the creation of a 
single EU payment area (SEPA) by 2010.Consolidation in euro area market 
infrastructure can be witnessed in Europe’s stock exchanges, where notable examples 
would include the merger of exchanges in Amsterdam, Brussels, Paris, and Lisbon in 
Euronext, and the integrated Nordic-Baltic market, which includes the stock exchanges 
of Copenhagen, Stockholm, Helsinki, Tallinn, Riga and Vilnius. Some progress has been 
made in the integration of payment systems, such as through TARGET and in clearing 
and settlement systems.  
In order to address the main barriers in this sector, the Commission White Paper on 
Financial Services Policy in 2005-2010 has set the agenda for EU-level financial-sector 
reform in the coming five years. However, there are areas where there may be a need for 
further efforts, such as clearing and settlement, where cross-border clearing and 
settlement transaction are far more costly than domestic transactions, retail sector, where 
initiatives are underway in the areas of mortgage credit, consumer credit directive and 
payment services, EU supervisory arrangements, where greater clarity and transparency 
is needed from the perspective of financial-system efficiency and stability and 
investment fund industry. Looking globally beyond the EU, is the need for international 
dialogues on financial markets and their regulation with the United States and Japan, but 
also with the growing new economies in China and India. 
4.4.4. Network industries  
The on-going process of liberalisation in the network industries implies a stepwise 
opening up of the telecommunications, postal services, energy and transport sectors to 
                                                 
99   See: ECB (2006). 
68competition. Since the early 1990s, these efforts have accelerated, with the aim to open 
up the network industries to competition while at the same time promoting effective 
regulatory structures for those aspects of the networks requiring public policy 
intervention. Network industries contributed in 2003 with about 7.5% to the total value 
added of the EU-15. This compares with the much higher share in the new Member 
States ranging from 9.8% in Hungary to 14.3% in Slovakia.  
Often the integration of markets is conditional on the physical integration of the 
respective national networks. Indeed, since most networks have originally been built for 
national (or even regional) markets, network service providers' access to national markets 
other than their own – and thus the development of cross-border competition – may often 
be impeded by insufficient interconnection. In some cases this can be overcome by 
increased investments in cross-border infrastructure, while in others it requires 
improvements in the interoperability of networks (e.g. harmonisation of technical norms 
and standards). This time consuming process should be accelerated by a number of 
ongoing measures, such as the recent creation of the European Railway Agency.  
 
BOX 4.4: REGULATORY CONDITIONS 
 
The OECD has calculated an indicator to track regulatory conditions in seven network industries. This 
indicator is based on different industry characteristics including entry regulation, public ownership, market 
structure, vertical integration and price controls. It shows a relatively high level of regulation in France, 
Greece and Ireland and lower levels in Germany, the Netherlands (see figure 4.3). While in 2003 network 
industries in the euro area were still more heavily regulated than in the US (except for electricity), the 
process of deregulation (over the period 2000-2003) was more rapid in the EU, especially in electricity and 
postal services. 
Figure 4-2:  Product market regulation in network industries 
   
Product market reform intensity in selected sectors 2003
Source: REGREF database, OECD
* EURO area: Simple average, excl. LU * EURO area: Simple average, excl. LU
Source: REGREF database, OECD Source: REGREF database, OECD
Change in product market reform intensity in selected sectors 2000-2003 (% change)
Note: The product market indicator of regulation is measured as a simple average of 
regulation in 7 non-manufacturing sectors: rail, road, airlines, gas, electricity, telecom and 
post. The indicators are normalised, ranging from 0 to 1, expressed as a percentage of the 
maximum score across OECD countries, where 1 reflects a relatively regulated product 
market.
Note: The indicator of product market regulation is measured as a simple average of 
regulation in 7 non-manufacturing sectors: rail, road, airlines, gas, electricity, telecom and 
post. The indicators are normalised, ranging from 0 to 1, expressed as a percentage of the 
maximum score across OECD countries, where 1 reflects a relatively regulated product 
market.
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The rationale behind the liberalisation of network industries is to improve their sectoral 
performance and thereby to generate wider-reaching macro-economic benefits. A 
defining structural characteristic of most network industries is the presence of 
69bottlenecks separating producers and customers, notably the grid itself – e.g. 
transmission lines, pipes, railway tracks. These industries are also exceptional in that 
they provide essential inputs for virtually all of the rest of the economy. The importance 
of the proper functioning of these industries is further reinforced by their role as 
providers of services of general economic interest. 
Most network industries were traditionally organised as vertically-integrated state-owned 
monopolies. Therefore, the separation (unbundling) of the bottleneck segments, which 
generally have inherent natural monopoly features from the potentially competitive 
segments (such as production, supply and maintenance), is a cornerstone of the market 
opening process. The resulting increase in competitive pressure should entail higher 
productivity (and productivity growth) and a downward pressure on prices, ultimately 
translating into higher economic growth.  
BOX 4.5:  QUANTIFYING THE EFFECTS OF FURTHER LIBERALISATION OF THE ENERGY SECTORS 
To assess the macro-economic impact of liberalisation, one has to distinguish between direct effects on the 
network industries, effects on customers and indirect economy-wide effects. Some direct effects on the 
industries themselves are likely to be negative as the competitive pressure and the drive for more efficient 
production are likely to exert downward pressure on employment levels and mark-ups in incumbent firms. 
Nonetheless, lower prices and product innovation ensuing from the competitive pressures may lead to 
higher demand and output and thus mitigate the adverse employment effects. Although the effects of 
liberalisation on customers are expected to be positive and much larger than the effects on the incumbent 
firms and their employees, they are by and large more dispersed and less tractable. Indeed, lower prices of 
network industry services would enhance welfare by raising real household incomes and lowering the costs 
for those industries which rely heavily on inputs from network industries. Furthermore, given the 
considerable weight of network industries in the Harmonised Index for Consumer Prices, price 
developments in network industries may also have important consequences for the efficient conduct of 
monetary policy
100. In contrast to the direct effects on firms and employees in the sector, the indirect 
effects are far less visible and thus hard to measure and quantify. Moreover, in terms of timing, one can 
expect the incumbent firms and their employees to feel the effects of liberalisation rather abruptly while 
customers reap benefits somewhat later. The indirect effects would normally take much longer to 
materialise. In section 3.2, an estimation of the ex-post effect of the liberalisation of telecommunications 
and electricity is discussed. In this box, an attempt is made to quantify the effects of a further liberalisation 
of the energy (electricity and gas) sector. This quantification is subject to significant data, statistical and 
model uncertainty. Accordingly, the results of this quantification can be considered only as indicative of 
the potential benefits of these regulatory reforms.  
The starting point of this simulation is the ECB estimate that further regulatory reforms in the EU 
electricity sector could lead to price reductions of about 20%. This result is based on the assumption that 
all EU 15 Member States align their regulatory conditions to those of the 'best practice' country and that 
prices adjust accordingly.  Given the share of the EU electricity industry in value added (1.9%) and the 
size of the non tradable sector (2/3 of value added), a price reduction of 20% would be associated with a 
price decline of 0.6% in the non tradable sector.  This reduction in prices has been translated into a total 
factor productivity (TFP) and a mark-up shock in the European Commission QUEST model. The shocks 
associated to the 20% price fall in the electricity sector were thus assumed to correspond to a TFP increase 
of 25% or to a decline in mark ups by 15 percentage points. In reality the reforms are likely to affect both 
mark-ups and efficiency and therefore, the observed price decline is the result of a combination of a mark-
up reduction and of efficiency gains. The shocks to TFP and to mark ups are calibrated in such a way that 
                                                 
100   For a further discussion of this link see Martin R., M. Roma, I. Vansteenkiste, (2005). 
101   Though the total GDP effect is similar, both channels have different effects on employment. With the 
efficiency (TFP) channel, the reform is associated with an increase in investment in the non tradable 
sector but a decline in employment and a shift of employment to the tradable sector. The net 
employment effect is slightly negative. With the mark up channel, the investment and employment 
effects are stronger. In the first case more output is produced with a more efficient use of resources 
while in the second case, increased competition shifts the demand for factors of production in an 
upward direction. 
 
70the full price decline is spread over a period of five years. The results for electricity on the real GDP are 
presented in Table 4-1.The respective effects of a TFP and a mark-up shock are different. Over a period of 
five years, the GDP effect generated with the two channels is quite similar and amounts to about 0.5% of 
GDP. In the longer run, however, the effect from a reduction in mark ups seems somewhat stronger
101. A 
similar analysis for the gas would lead to effects equal to roughly 30% of those observed for electricity. 
 
Table 4-1: Effects on real GDP of a further opening up in the electricity sector 
 
 
 
GDP effect of a 25% increase in 
TFP in the electricity sector 
GDP effect of a 15 percentage point 
mark-up reduction in the electricity 
sector 
After 1 Year  +0.02 
 
+0.03 
 
After 5 Years  +0.51 
 
+0.57 
 
After 10 Years  +0.51 
 
+0.62 
 
 
Note: figures are % deviation from the base year. Investment refers to the non-tradable sector. 
Source: Quest-model, run with adapted ECB estimates. 
 
However effective competition does not follow automatically from legal market opening. 
As the recent Commission sectoral inquiry on distortions to competition in the electricity 
and gas sectors points out, a lack of liquidity in wholesale markets, insufficient 
unbundling of network and supply activities, and a lack of transparency benefits 
incumbents and undermines the position of new entrants. Direct competition remains 
difficult in network industries such as electricity or gas because the pipelines and 
electricity grids are well established and excessive switching costs may discourage 
customers to change their provider. Indirectly these markets become subject to 
competition as soon as less efficient players are acquired by more efficient ones.  
However, such restructuring processes – in particular in cases of foreign acquirers or new 
entrants – often encounter the resistance of some Member States' governments. This can 
be in response to lobbying by vested interests, through reluctance to lose influence over 
major sectors of the economy or through fear that the public interest may not be 
adequately served in a liberalised environment. This resistance may take the form of 
slowness in transposing EU directives into national law, weak enforcement of the 
provisions relating to market opening or the introduction of unnecessarily cumbersome 
and time-consuming procedures that discourage new entrants. Some Member State 
governments also seem to pursue a policy of promoting incumbent enterprises as 
"national champions". On one hand, these governments may encourage incumbents to 
engage in some mergers and acquisitions to strengthen their market positions. On the 
other hand, governments sometimes intervene to discourage or block mergers which 
would result in a change of nationality of ownership of the domestic enterprise. 
However, this logic of artificially sheltering national firms from competition and 
maintaining domestic monopoly seems counter-productive, and might hamper the long-
term international competitiveness of the companies. The similar example of the 
approach of successful Asian countries relates to catch-up strategies by developing 
economies. 
714.5.  Fiscal barriers 
Member States are free to design their tax systems according to their preferences and 
there is no across the board harmonisation of the national tax regimes. The existence of 
25 different tax systems, however, creates barriers to the mobility of factors and thus, to 
the full implementation of the Internal Market. The main barriers are constituted by 
different corporate, personal and value-added taxes. 
The need for companies involved into cross-border activities to deal with 25 different 
accounting and corporate  tax systems results in high compliance costs. In a 2004 
comprehensive survey covering more than 700 EU companies, the European 
Commission found that these costs represent 1.9% of tax collected for large companies 
and 30.9% of tax collected for SMEs. In addition, Companies with subsidiaries or 
permanent establishment in another Member State have larger compliance costs than 
companies having domestic subsidiaries only. This is an indication of tax obstacles to 
cross-border activities. Among compliances costs, four out of five large companies see 
issues related to transfer pricing and double taxation as a major problem
102.  
Part of the remedy would be the agenda proposed by the Commission in 2001 to work 
out an optional common consolidated corporate tax base for companies doing business in 
Europe. The project presents several important technical difficulties that are currently 
dealt with by a working group of national and European experts. It carries nevertheless a 
substantial potential welfare gain for the European Union, both thanks to the 
coordination of corporate tax policies and the reduced tax compliance costs that a 
common tax base would bring. Provided it is well-designed, it would also bring 
additional benefits via cross-border fiscal consolidation and better transfer pricing 
resolutions, two aspects that are costly for both businesses and tax authorities. 
Another tax obstacle concerns the VAT. In the 2004 survey, a substantial percentage of 
large companies (86.1%) also quote cross-border repayment or refund of VAT as a major 
difficulty. 53.5% of large companies have not requested refunding at some point because 
of the complexity or the length of the procedures under the 8
th VAT Directive.  
There are no rules at Community level regarding personal taxation of cross-border 
workers. Member States agree special rules for cross-border workers in their bilateral 
double taxation conventions. Since these rules reflect the special situation between two 
Member States, they vary from one double taxation convention to another.  
More generally, the absence of an EU multilateral tax treaty is a major hurdle to capital 
and labour mobility. Currently, cross-border taxation issues are dealt with by ways of 
bilateral tax treaties (if existing) between Member States. The rules differ from treaty to 
treaty, creating confusion and uncertainty. Furthermore, cases involving more than two 
Member States imply triangular situations and may potentially lead to differences in 
rules and/or interpretations between tax authorities. This is for example the case of 
workers who are hired in one Member State but are posted in other Member States 
during the year. There are frequent situations where some workers do not spend more 
                                                 
102  A Commission report estimates that "medium sized multinational enterprises spend approximately 
EUR 1 to EUR 2 million a year on complying with transfer pricing rules" and that "large 
multinational enterprises incur compliance costs related to transfer pricing of approximately EUR 4 
up to EUR 5.5 million a year. These figures do not include the costs and risks of double taxation due 
to transfer pricing disputes" (European Commission, 2001a. p.343). 
72than half a year in any country, creating confusion on their tax (and social security) 
situation.  
BOX 4.6:  QUANTIFYING POTENTIAL TAX COOPERATION BENEFITS
103  
Various attempts have been made to assess the potential gains from increased tax cooperation: 
–  The European Commission used in its 2001 Communication
104 the Tax Analyser Model to assess 
the effects of a harmonisation of tax rates and/or bases on the dispersion of effective tax rates and 
found that a significant decrease in this dispersion is only achieved in the tax rate harmonisation 
scenario.  
–  Mendoza and Tesar
105 simulate capital tax competition that triggers an adjustment of either labour 
or consumption taxes to adjust the budgets. The respective net welfare gains of tax coordination in 
their simulations are respectively equal to 0.26% and 0.04% of lifetime consumption. 
–  Sørensen
106 shows EU-average welfare gains from tax coordination that are ranging from 0.18% 
to 0.94% of GDP. This potential gain from coordinating corporate taxes in Europe increases to 
1.42% of GDP for the scenario where the marginal public revenue is spent on public goods and 
not on transfers.  
–  Parry
107 uses a model to assess the welfare losses of tax competition and introduces, as additional 
scenarios - possibilities of capital flights outside of the EU, a Leviathan behaviour with large 
states capable of influencing the after-tax rate of return on capital, and non-competitive 
governments (that is governments are less likely to cut taxes, knowing that others may imitate 
them). These scenarios respectively reduce the welfare gains of coordination by about 25% and 
50%. The 'Leviathan' scenario unsurprisingly reduces the welfare gains (although capital taxation 
may be too low or too high depending on the parameters of the model). The same goes with the 
scenario of non-competitive governments.  
–  The magnitude of these results is broadly confirmed by a study of Copenhagen Economics
108 in 
which various tax harmonisation scenarios yield welfare gains between 0.02% and 0.21% of 
GDP. 
4.6.  Free movement of people 
The free movement of labour between Member States of the European Community is 
possible since 1968. However, overall labour mobility in Europe has remained rather 
low. In the EU-15, only 0.1% of the working-age population change their country of 
residence in a given year. In comparison, in the US, about 3% of the working-age 
population moves to a different State every year. Also labour markets remain segmented, 
country by country. Within countries, regional mobility rates are around 1% of the total 
working-age population in 2005, with rates below 0.3% in several Member States.  
Language is one of the main barriers to geographical mobility. Across the EU, only every 
second person speaks another language than his or her mother tongue. In addition, there 
are large differences between Member States
109. Other discouraging factors
110 for 
individuals are the expected transaction costs and/or the lack or insufficient information 
                                                 
103 See: Nicodeme (2006). 
104 See: European Commission (2001d). 
105 See: Mendoza and Tesar (2005). 
106 See: Sørensen (2000, 2001, 2004a, 2004b). 
107 See: Parry (2003). 
108 See: Copenhagen Economics (2004). 
109 See: European Commission (2005b). 
110 See: ECAS report (2006). 
73about administrative and financial burdens associated with mobility; economic ties to the 
home country (e.g. home-ownership); about the society and job prospects, legal 
requirements of the destination country; family concerns (disruption of family life, 
difficulties for the spouse, or children who want to join the migrant), etc. Another major 
difficulty is the lack of convergence between national regulations. The EU has 25 
different social security, taxation and pension systems. Every Member State determines 
how to operate its own social security system, the benefits and conditions.  
There have been a number of initiatives to address these problems
111. This includes a 
variety of Community language learning programmes; a European health insurance card; 
the coordination of social security schemes; a proposal for a directive on the portability 
of pension; and a vast information network to provide targeted information and 
personally tailored assistance to workers and their families. However, these initiatives 
have not succeeded in establishing a genuine policy of mobility at European labour-
market level. This was also reflected in the recent public consultation on the future of the 
Internal Market. Respondents mainly mentioned the lack of portability of pension rights, 
differences in social security systems and delays in the free movement of workers from 
the new Member States.  
4.7.  Barriers to the diffusion of knowledge and innovation  
Market integration has a twofold impact on the incentives to innovate. First, greater 
market size increases profits and allows writing off the costs of innovation and invention 
over a larger volume of sales.
112. Second, firms operating in a more integrated market, 
and therefore exposed to higher competition, have stronger incentives to innovate in 
order to retain their market positions and stay ahead of the competitors
113. Moreover, the 
creation of a single market should lead to increased knowledge spillovers because of 
more intensified trade and investments. Contrary to these expectations, current Member 
States differ quite substantially in terms of their innovative performance and most of 
them are lagging significantly behind the US and Japan in this respect (see section 3.1.6). 
Evidence also suggests that EU companies do not fully exploit the opportunities given by 
the Internal Market – about 60% of the innovative companies tend to launch their new 
products on national markets while only 25% do it in other Member States
114 (see Figure 
4.4).  
As indicated in section 3.1.6, the reasons why the Internal Market has been an 
insufficient driver of innovation are that markets are still too fragmented, in particular, in 
services, that the potential of public procurement is insufficiently exploited and that a 
clear and more efficient Intellectual Property Right (IPR) system is lacking.  As the two 
first issues have already been discussed above, this section focuses on the last one.  
                                                 
111 See: European Commission (2006g). 
112 See: Schmookler (1966 b). 
113 See: Aghion et al. (2005), Griffith et al. (2006). 
114 See: European Commission (2004d).  
74Figure 4-3:  Cross-border provision of innovative goods and services 
 
Source: Innobarometer 2004 
It is now generally accepted that IPRs can play an important role in fostering innovation 
but the design of an effective IPR system remains a difficult challenge. In particular, 
achieving the right degree of intellectual property protection is difficult in practice. First, 
the role of Intellectual Property Rights varies considerably across industry sectors and 
types of inventions. Over the past decades, the domains covered by patents have been 
extended in many countries to include biotechnology, software and business methods. 
The question arising here is whether the incentives provided by competitive markets 
mechanisms need to be always supplemented by IPR and in which cases it is necessary. 
Second, granting protection over commercially interesting invention must not stifle 
diffusion of innovation or obstruct innovative activities. In case of cumulative 
innovation, excessive intellectual property protection may hinder development of new 
products and processes that build on previous technology advancements. In this respect, 
it is important to encourage the diffusion of innovative technologies through licensing 
agreements. Third, incumbents may use patents strategically to block their competitors 
from developing new products
115. The issue here is to prevent strategic patenting as it 
distorts competition and hampers development and circulation of new technologies. 
Finally, the effectiveness of patents as a tool to stimulate innovation and technology 
diffusion will also depend on the capacity of patent offices and their ability to select 
genuinely new and non-trivial inventions. 
SMEs, especially start-ups, have specific needs for patents, as their business is generally 
focused on one activity and the protection of a competitive advantage based on 
technology may be crucial for their survival. A well-functioning IPR system would offer 
SMEs in particular the opportunity to assemble a valuable patent portfolio. Such a 
                                                 
115 See: Shapiro (2002). 
75portfolio could then be used as collateral to obtain the necessary financing of the research 
required to transform to patent into a marketable product. However, evidence shows that 
EU based SMEs tend to file fewer patents than large companies, since they do not benefit 
from the same economies of scale, bargaining power, etc as large firms
116. Moreover, 
SMEs are less able to detect and track down infringements of the patents that they own. 
Finally, EU based companies are also faced with far greater patenting costs than in the 
US, which is a problem for SMEs in particular. This is largely due to high translation and 
maintenance costs and the cost of having to defend a European patent separately in the 
courts of each Member State, in the event of litigation, with the risk of conflicting 
decisions.  
The EU Member States are currently characterised by different multi-layered patent 
systems. The establishment of a European patent system aiming at harmonising national 
administrative and legal practices would, thus, be an important contribution to better 
knowledge diffusion. It could create clear rules and provide access to simple and 
inexpensive procedures for obtaining patent protection for inventions as well as 
predictable, cost effective and accessible resolution of disputes. There are presently two 
major international proposals to harmonise the European patent systems: the London 
Protocol
117 and the European Patent Litigation Agreement (EPLA)
118. In addition, there 
is one Community initiative, the Community Patent which adoption failed due to 
unsolved dispute on the question whether the validated patent documents need to be 
translated into the different national languages
119. 
5.  REFLECTIONS ON THE INTERNAL MARKET IN THE 21
ST CENTURY 
The European Internal Market project, which was initiated in the mid-1980s with the 
publication of the White Paper on the Single Market Programme, opened up perspectives 
for restoring confidence of European business and for improving the performance of 
European companies through the formation of a better integrated, more competitive and 
innovative market place. While the Internal Market has contributed to promote 
integration and to a lesser extent competition within the EU, its potential has not been 
fully exploited. The contribution of the Internal Market to the transformation of the EU 
into a more dynamic, innovative and competitive economy at world level was 
insufficient because: (i) existing instrument to remove non-tariff barriers to cross-border 
transactions and factor movements are not fully adequate; (ii) some markets remain 
fragmented; and (iii) the Internal Market has failed to fully adapt to a changing 
environment. The Single Market Review provides an opportunity to sketch a new vision 
for the Internal Market in the 21st century and to give it new impetus. This chapter 
suggests eight ideas that could be further developed within the context of the Single 
Market Review. 
                                                 
116 See: Léveque and Méniere (2006). 
117   London Agreement of 2000 proposes provisions aimed at reducing the costs of translation of patents 
granted under European Patent Convention of 1963. 
118   The European Patent Litigation Agreement (EPLA) proposes an integrated judicial system based on 
uniform rules of procedures with a common appeal court. 
119   For more detail see: Dietmar (2006). 
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(1)  Internal Markets for services and knowledge are essential for productivity 
growth. 
Due to the development of information and communication technologies in particular, 
services have become increasingly tradable. As a result, services producers in the EU are 
becoming more and more exposed to competition from third countries. An integrated and 
competitive home market is essential to face this challenge and raise productivity levels 
in the services sector. If the European Union wants to replicate the spurt in productivity 
growth that the US has experienced, it needs to offer service providers the freedom to 
introduce new technologies and business practices. While progress has been made in 
network industries and financial services, the retail and wholesale trade sector remains 
heavily regulated, which has retarded technological and organisational improvements in 
this sector. 
More generally, the European Union would benefit from a faster diffusion of cost-
effective production technologies supported by better developed Internal Market for 
knowledge. Such an EU market for knowledge would have to be based on a common 
system of Intellectual Property Rights. If Europe is to become a region in which 
innovation and ideas can circulate without being impeded by national barriers, there is a 
clear need for harmonisation of European administrative and legal practices in this area. 
At the same time a better balance between the need to provide incentives to innovators 
and the goal to encourage the diffusion of innovative technologies and business practices 
would have to be achieved. This implies to develop transparent, inexpensive and 
uncomplicated Intellectual Property Rights system. This system would aim at (i) 
developing markets for technological assets which enable transactions for the use, 
diffusion and creation of know-how, for example, by expanding patent licensing: (ii) 
improving the quality of patents to strike a better balance between the protection of 
owners versus users and prevent strategic patenting; (iii) ensuring a better coordination 
between the IPR policy and other policies crucial for innovation, such as R&D, education 
and competition. 
The diffusion of innovation is also affected by public procurement practices. In certain 
sectors, like construction, defence, aerospace, ICT or public services (education and 
health), the joint purchasing power of public bodies constitutes a substantial share of 
demand, which can significantly affect innovation and technology adoption. Industry 
tends to react strongly to demand impulses generated by the government, particularly for 
new technologies
120, because governments tend to be more willing or able to incur the 
high start-up costs associated with the development of innovative products or processes. 
Considering the fact that public procurement is responsible for around one-sixth of the 
EU GDP, it would be fair to say that its potential to promote innovation has not been 
fully exploited. 
Therefore, the role of public procurement as a tool to foster corporate investment in new 
technologies and innovation could be better exploited. In this context, three questions are 
of particular interest: (i) the role of the pre-commercial public procurement (i.e. 
promoting the role of the State as a “first buyer” of new goods and services) for fostering 
                                                 
120   The costs associated with technology adoption are typically incurred at the beginning of the adoption 
process and cannot be recovered (sunk costs) while the benefits from adopting new technology are 
mostly flow benefits which occur throughout the life of the acquired innovation.  
77innovation; (ii) the potential of "second-sourcing" (crating the possibility to oust the 
incumbent producer in case of poor performance replacing it by an entrant) and "dual-
sourcing" (launching bidding competitions which are split between two different firms), 
to improve procurement practices; and (iii) the role of the State as a “lead user” to test 
innovative solutions and promote their adoption by private users.  
(2)  The Internal Market can contribute to the smooth functioning of EMU. 
The Internal Market is essential for a smooth functioning of EMU because it speeds up 
the process of adjustment to shocks. By creating a more competitive business 
environment it increases incentives for firms to adapt prices and quantities to changing 
market conditions. More integrated and competitive product markets help ensure that 
wage moderation and productivity gains are reflected more rapidly in lower price levels. 
Moreover, they contribute to amplify the beneficial effects of labour market reforms. For 
example, if prices are flexible, productivity gains from technological progress will be 
translated into lower prices, which will drive up demand and limit the negative impact of 
technological progress on employment in the short term. A better functioning Internal 
Market also eases the reallocation of resources across the EU territory.  
Therefore, facilitating the adjustment processes in EMU would be an essential 
component of the Internal Market in the 21st century. More flexible wage and price 
setting behaviour, more integrated and developed financial markets, a better 
functioning single market for services, as well as more flexible labour markets clearly 
emerge as having a very important influence in this respect. 
(3)  Enlargement has increased the heterogeneity with the Internal Market. 
Enlargement has increased the opportunities to be reaped from the Internal Market but it 
has also increased the heterogeneity among its members, increasing the risks of tensions 
between Member States. Differences in industrial structure and the stage of economic 
development tend to be reflected in different economic priorities. This diversity might be 
resolved naturally as the new Member States catch up with the EU average and 
differences in industrial structure gradually disappear. This however might take some 
time and tensions in areas such as corporate taxation and migration might have to be 
addressed in the meantime.  
Regarding corporate taxation, the issue of corporate tax harmonisation/competition has 
received much attention although there is no clear evidence regarding both the existence 
and the effects of tax competition in Europe. This does not mean that there is no need for 
EU initiatives in this area. Several tax obstacles to the implementation of a truly 
integrated European market can be identified. Moreover, there is evidence that firms try 
to avoid paying taxes by relocating (part of) their activities abroad. The proposition made 
by the European Commission to have a common consolidated corporate tax base for 
companies doing business in Europe offers substantial benefits, in particular by reducing 
tax compliance costs associated with the existence of different national taxation systems.  
Regarding migration, the fear of massive flows of people moving from the new Member 
States to the old Member States did not materialise, partly due to temporary 
arrangements restricting the free movement of workers. Migration inflows were 
concentrated in countries such as Ireland, Sweden and the UK that did not impose such 
restrictions. Migration policies of EU Member States vary widely. While this provides 
ample room to learn from each other and to identify what works and what does not work, 
it also creates a need to deal with undesirable cross-country spill-over effects and to 
78correct potential co-ordination failures that may arise, for example, from competition for 
highly skilled migrants. A common approach to migration policies amongst EU Member 
States could therefore be considered. 
(4)  The Internal Market rules should be considered within a global context. 
The radical reduction of international communication and co-ordination costs implies 
that EU firms can offshore specific tasks within the production process, leading to what 
Baldwin names a new paradigm of globalisation. This task-level off-shoring has 
implications for the strategy to be put in place. Whereas before international competition 
used to be primarily between firms and sectors in different nations, it occurs now 
between individual workers performing similar tasks in different nations. The economic 
and social impact of globalisation has therefore become more difficult to predict. It 
should be clear however that building up the ability of individual workers to respond to 
different task requests is crucially important if the EU wants to seize new opportunities 
and minimise the adjustment costs.  
Lessons can also be drawn from the industrial policies used by our trading partners to 
enhance their competitiveness. For example, the dominance of the US in areas such as 
ICT may be linked to state support for the early development of such technologies. The 
EU has been less successful in this respect, because markets for high-tech products such 
as defence equipment are fragmented and Member States have concentrated too much on 
supporting weak companies and sectors. The new framework for State aid to innovation 
can be considered as an important first step in tackling this problem. 
When drawing up Internal Market rules, it is increasingly important to take the global 
context into account. This may imply simplifying our regulatory environment and 
entering into a dialogue with our partners in order to agree on common standards. Such 
standards should neither compromise the ability of EU exporters to sell abroad, nor 
limit the entry of imports into the EU market. The use of internal standards that are also 
acceptable internationally offers a competitive advantage to European companies. A 
wider use internationally of Europe's high standards in terms of consumer and 
environmental protection would be beneficial in this respect. At the same time one 
should make sure that strict EU rules do not create a competitive disadvantage for EU 
businesses globally, a point also stressed by respondents to the public consultation on the 
Single Market in the 21st century. From this standpoint, the question to be analysed 
would be whether setting internal EU standards promotes the diffusion and development 
of technologies or, on the contrary, by pre-empting competition among standards, slows 
down improvement of existing standards and the development of more efficient 
alternatives, hurting EU competitiveness in international markets.  
Increasing international standardisation improves market access for all parties: it also 
gives third countries better access to a homogeneous EU market. However, it has to be 
recognised, that the majority of our leading trading partners are less open than the EU. 
Therefore, trade negotiations have a role in ensuring that markets worldwide are 
genuinely open and that international rules are applied openly and transparently. 
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(5)  Well-designed Internal Market and external trade policies are mutually 
supportive. 
An integrated and competitive Internal Market helps European companies compete at 
world level, as scale economies within the home market create possibilities for cost 
reductions and competition (both from within and outside the Internal Market) ensures 
that such cost reductions are translated into lower prices. An Internal Market that is in 
addition open to competition and investment from outside will be more innovative 
because exposed to new technologies and production methods developed elsewhere. 
Competitive markets have indeed helped European manufacturing industry to maintain 
its share in world markets in the face of globalisation. However, the EU is losing ground 
in rapidly growing markets, particularly in Asia. Well designed external policies that 
ensure the observation of fair trade rules internationally are complementary to internal 
policies. Only if EU firms are granted non-discriminatory access to markets across the 
world can the benefits from the Internal Market be fully reaped. It would be desirable to 
reach an international agreement on standards and regulations, which neither 
compromises the ability of EU exporters to sell abroad, nor limits the entry of imports in 
the EU Internal Market. 
(6)  Potential synergies between the Internal Market policies and  
competition and innovation policies can be better exploited. 
Internal Market policies contribute towards creating the appropriate framework 
conditions for European firms to be competitive at world level. Other policies, including 
in particular competition (state aids, merger control and anti-trust) and innovation (R&D, 
education, ICT) policies, have similar objectives. Potential gains from integrating these 
different policy instruments within a systemic approach are substantial. The new Strategy 
for Growth and Jobs is precisely aimed at exploiting the synergies between the 
different structural policy instruments and between macroeconomic and structural 
policies.  
For example, efficiency and innovation considerations should be better taken into 
account when designing competition policy. Steps in this direction have been taken in the 
areas of anti-trust, mergers and state aids. For example, the modernisation of anti-trust 
policy carried out in 2000 allows to better take into account the efficiencies arising from 
agreements between enterprises. Similarly, the new Merger Regulation includes 
provisions allowing the consideration of efficiency arguments in the analysis of mergers.  
In the area of State Aid, the new framework for State Aid for R&D and Innovation gives 
more leeway to support innovative SMEs. These reforms contribute to better integrate 
competition and Internal Market policies. Synergies between Internal Market and 
innovation policies are also crucial. In this respect, a more efficient regulation of 
electronic communications could contribute to the development of digital technologies in 
Europe, while a better designed system of IPRs could facilitate the diffusion of 
innovations within the Internal Market. 
There are strong spillovers between national and Community policies as well. All 
Member States contribute to the well-functioning of the Internal Market, which can be 
considered as a common good belonging to all EU members. For example, overly strict 
regulation in one Member State may divert investment flows and thus have a negative 
effect on allocative efficiency. Similarly, the development of innovative technologies 
80may depend on achieving a critical mass of resources or knowledge, which can only be 
achieved through a combination of national resources. A better coordination of policies 
at the EU level and an increased exploitation of synergies between Community and 
national policies can therefore help ensure that the available resources are used more 
efficiently. 
 
 (7)  Adjustment costs associated with market integration need to be considered. 
This would involve a close monitoring of the impact of reforms undertaken. 
Deepening the Internal Market implies the opening up to competition of sectors (such as 
the services sector), which may be politically sensitive because it directly affects the 
employment of a large number of people. Although undertaken to increase overall 
welfare, reforms tend to carry short-term adjustment costs for certain groups of 
economic agents. Benefits usually come only in the longer-term, are more widely spread 
across wide groups of population and are often not well understood by the population 
due to the complex nature of processes in the economy and their outcomes. For example, 
opening-up to competition telecommunication markets will have negative consequences 
for the incumbents facing a decline in monopoly power while the benefits are shared by 
all the consumers of telecommunication services. As a result, public acceptability of 
these reforms is very low and a continuous push towards further reforms may generate 
"reform fatigue" and become politically unsustainable. 
Unless an effort is made to increase the public acceptability of market opening and 
liberalisation is will be very difficult to enact these reforms. In order to increase 
acceptability, it is crucial to provide unambiguous evidence illustrating the overall 
benefits of reforms proposed; to identify the most appropriate sequencing of reforms; and 
to facilitate the process of adjustment particularly for those most directly affected. From 
this, it should be clear that reform proposals would benefit from theoretical analysis and 
diagnosis to guide the policy design ex ante. This would help to identify social costs 
associated with the further opening up of sectors to competition and to define policy 
measures to address these costs. Experience of already existing instruments at the 
national and Community level, like the European Globalisation Fund, could be useful. 
Moreover, once the reforms have been implemented it will be important to ensure a close 
monitoring of the effects of the reforms undertaken. The horizontal evaluation of the 
performance of network industries is an example of this monitoring.  
(8)  A move from a legalistic approach to a more economic approach based on 
the monitoring of markets offers potential benefits. 
The legal basis of Internal Market policies is increasingly founded on economic logic. 
Better market regulation depends on a better understanding of the obstacles preventing 
markets from functioning well. This better understanding can only be achieved by an 
increased monitoring of market developments. This more economic approach has started 
to be implemented in the area of competition policy, where sector enquiries, such as 
those undertaken in the energy and retail banking sectors, have proven to be a valuable 
tool for identifying the nature and scope of competition problems within the Internal 
Market. However, the market monitoring to be developed should be wider in scope and 
also analyse barriers to market integration, market access, technological development 
and innovation as well as price and wage adjustments to changing market conditions.  
Internal Market monitoring aims at diagnosing the sources of obstacles to the good 
operation of markets. It would benefit from the increased transparency, which would 
81result from making the outcome of the monitoring process part of the public domain. 
This would be true in particular if the monitored activities were economically and 
socially important.  
The information gathered in the monitoring of key goods and services markets could 
improve the governance of the Internal Market, by, amongst other things, allowing to 
choose the regulatory approach which is the best suited to the specific needs of a given 
sector. Regulatory questions addressed could be (i) whether there is a need for sector-
specific regulation or whether economy-wide regulation and consumer protection 
policies are sufficient; (ii) the appropriate form of any sector-specific regulation, i.e. self-
regulation, legislation enforced through the courts or imposed through specific regulatory 
agencies; (iii) the appropriate geographical level of regulation  (regional, national, EU or 
supranational); and (iv) the extent of any supervision or coordination of  national 
authorities at the EU level.  
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